

Appendix for “The Historical Rarity of Foreign-Deployed Nuclear Weapon Crises”

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SECTION ONE.

This section lists all crises involving nuclear deploying states from World War II until the end of the period they deployed nuclear weapons abroad. The three states examined are: United States (1945-2013); Soviet Union (1945-92); and United Kingdom (1945-98). I rely on the International Crisis Behavior Dataset. For each crisis this appendix provides information on:

1. International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Crisis Number
2. Triggering Entity
3. Opponents
4. Region¹
5. Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments
6. Discussion

Entries with an (*) have one member that appears only in the dyadic level dataset² and not the ICB data viewer.³ For instance, the Data Viewer lists the 1958 Aborted Indonesia Coup as having only one crisis actor, Indonesia, but the dyadic dataset codes it as a crisis between the United States and Indonesia. To ensure that I omit no cases I include all crises involving the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom that appear in *either* dataset. Note that all dyadic data is take from the updated Version 11. The Data Viewer for specific crises for 2008-2013 has been updated with Version 11. Data Viewer information for 1945-2007 crises is in the process of being updated and so I rely on the existing Version 10 that is available at the time of submission (September 2016).

All direct quotations are taken from the ICB Data Viewer unless otherwise noted.

In the article I examine crises involving the nuclear *target* states (China, North Korea, Soviet Union, United States) during the actual years that they were the nearest major rival to foreign-deployed nuclear weapons using a standard definition for foreign-nuclear deployments (FNDs). In this section of the Appendix I expand on the analysis of the article. I examine every crisis involving each nuclear *deploying* state (Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States) from 1945 until the year after they stopped deploying nuclear weapons abroad. This provides a robustness check to verify that there were not crises that caused by the impending or actual deployment of nuclear weapons abroad beyond those identified in the main article. In addition, as noted in the article, the United States deployed nuclear weapons to the Japanese territories of Chichi Jima (1956-1964), Iwo Jima (1956-1959), and Okinawa (1954-1972).⁴ These deployments occurred during the U.S. occupation of these areas and thus are not technically foreign-nuclear deployments. However, one might consider this an overly restrictive definition. I therefore also investigate if these deployments, coded as deployments to Japan, contributed to crises. As the brief case summaries below demonstrate I did not find any such crises. The collapse of the Soviet

¹ I coded Regions using Correlates of War country codes. North America and Caribbean (2-99); South America (100-199); Europe (200-399); Sub-Saharan Africa (400-599); Middle East and North Africa (600-699); Central, South and East Asia (700-799); Southeast Asia (800-899).

² Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld *A Study of Crisis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Michael, Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, Patrick James and David Quinn, *International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook, Version 11* (2016); <https://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/data-collections/>

³ <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/dataviewer/>; <https://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/data-collections/>

⁴ For deployment dates see Dan Reiter, “Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 10, no. 1 (2014):67.

Union resulted in four nuclear successor states: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine. In the main article I do not consider the weapons in Belarus (1991/2-1996), Kazakhstan (1991/2-1994), and the Ukraine (1991/2-1996) to be foreign nuclear deployments.⁵ Relaxing the coding to consider these FNDs does not alter the results of the analysis because, as the brief case summaries below make clear, the two crises involving Russia from 1991-1996 were not linked to FNDs.

I. *United States (1954-2013)*

Azerbaijan (1946)

Crisis Number: 108

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Soviet Union

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments for several reasons. First, there were as of yet no American FNDs. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of Soviet involvement and troops in Iran after the end of World War II. During World War II Allied forces, including most importantly British and Soviet forces, had entered parts of Iran to secure supply lines and deter any outside encroachments. An initial crisis occurred for Iran in late 1945 when the Tudeh Party attempted to take control of Tabriz, a city in northern Iran near the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and headquarters for Soviet forces in Iran. Soviet troops prevented Iranian government forces from entering the region to reassert Tehran's control. The main part of the crisis involving the United States began in March 1946 following the Soviet failure to withdraw its troops from Iran per agreement. Iran appealed to the United States and United Kingdom. The United States exerted significant diplomatic pressure and the issue came before the newly formed United Nations Security Council. Faced with growing opposition the Soviet Union announced that Soviet troops would be withdrawn within six weeks of March 24. The final Soviet forces withdrew on May 9, 1946. Note that the start date in the Dyadic Data is 1946, the start of the crisis between the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union; the start date in the data viewer is August 1945 which was the start of the crisis for Iran.

Turkish Straits (1946)

Crisis Number: 111

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: Soviet Union

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments for several reasons. First, there were as of yet no American FNDs. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis resulted from Soviet pressure on Turkey and Turkish appeals for American support. The Soviet Union, and Russia before it, had long sought unfettered access to the Mediterranean Sea. Accordingly, in August 1946 the Soviet Union issued a demand to revise the Montreaux Convention providing Turkey control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. At the same time Turkey and the United States believed that the Soviet Union was moving military forces into nearby areas. The United States elected to back Turkey and dispatched various military forces, including the newest aircraft carrier the *U.S.S.*

⁵ For deployment dates for Kazakhstan and the Ukraine see Pavil Podvig, ed., *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 24. For Belarus see Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, "Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence," *American Journal of Political Science*, 58, no. 4 (October 2014), Stata .dta file. See also <http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/belarus/>.

Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Mediterranean Sea to show support for Turkey. Faced with strong opposition the Soviet Union backed down.

Berlin Blockade (1948)

Crisis Number: 123

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: Soviet Union

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments for several reasons. First, there were as of yet no American FNDs. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis resulted from the Soviet decision to blockade the land and river routes to Western occupation zones in Berlin. The immediate trigger for the Soviet decision was the Western – British, French, and American – decision to introduce a new currency into their occupation zones outside the four power framework. The deeper issue for Soviet leaders was the movement this represented to an independent West German state that could imperil Soviet policy in Germany broadly, including its occupation zone in what would become East Germany, and with it the broader Soviet security buffer zone in Eastern Europe. The United States elected to remain in the city and resupply it via the air. Soviet hopes that the airlift would fail did not come to pass and, unwilling to escalate to war, the Soviet Union eventually backed down and allowed Western ground access into Berlin.⁶

Korean War (1950)

Crisis Number: 132, 133, 140

Triggering Entity: North Korea

Opponents: North Korea, China

Region: Central, South, and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No.

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments for several reasons. First, there were as of yet no American FNDs. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis, in reality a war, began with North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. Korea had been occupied by Japan from 1910 to 1945. Following World War II the United States and Soviet Union effectively divided Korea into two separate zones at the 38th parallel. Each side installed its preferred regime. In North Korea Kim Il-sung, with Soviet backing, consolidated power. Kim consistently sought Soviet support to conquer the southern zone by force. It was not until 1950 that Stalin relented and the North Korean attack commenced. U.S. leaders quickly viewed the invasion as part of a broader Soviet expansionist campaign and decided to intervene. A series of UN resolutions on June 25, 27, and July 7 authorized military force to evict North Korean forces. After initial setbacks UN forces, primarily American and South Korea, conducted an amphibious assault at Inchon and quickly routed North Korean military forces. U.S. leadership then elected to 'rollback' communism in the area by destroying the North Korean regime and unifying Korea. South Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel on September 30 with American forces following on October 7. The People's Republic of China viewed this as a major threat and feared that if the United States eliminated North Korea it would pose an intolerable threat to the young PRC regime. Chinese forces began crossing the Yalu River separating China from North Korea in late October and briefly clashed with UN forces. Major Chinese assaults against US forces followed in late November, surprising the Americans and leading to the retreat of U.S. forces. The war settled into a bitter three year struggle before ending in stalemate on July 27, 1953. Following President Dwight Eisenhower's election, U.S. officials conveyed to China the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons.

⁶ On Soviet motivations see also Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

This would likely have involved aircraft operating from Guam or Okinawa. Had weapons been transferred to South Korea it would likely have been for immediate use by aircraft rather than sustained deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea or non-U.S. territory.⁷ The threat therefore does not constitute a potential or actual FND. Note that the ICB data codes three separate crises for the Korean War: the initial North Korean attack (132) and response; the U.S. decision to counter-invade North Korea and Chinese response (133); renewed Chinese assaults and American nuclear threats (140). I group all three crises together in this discussion as they are part of a single war and for simplicity of discussion.

Trieste II* (1953)

Crisis Number: 142

Triggering Entity: Multi-state

Opponents: Yugoslavia

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments for several reasons. First, there were as of yet no American FNDs. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis resulted from the U.S. and British announcement that they would terminate military governance in Trieste, withdraw troops, and “relinquish the administration to the Italian government.” The status of Trieste had long been contested between Italy and Yugoslavia and the possibility of Italian control triggered a crisis for Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia closed the border and called up military reserves. Italy responded by placing three divisions near the border. A December 1953 agreement for the withdrawal of Italian and Yugoslav forces from the border “ended the crisis for both actors.” In 1975 the Treaty of Osimo divided Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia.

Guatemala (1954)

Crisis Number: 144

Triggering Entity: United States

Opponents: Guatemala

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the ICB summary of the crisis makes clear it was unrelated to nuclear issues: “Agrarian reform and

⁷ In addition to the ICB summary, see Shen Zhihua, *Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1960s*, Neil Silver, trans. (New York: Routledge, 2012); Telegram to Stalin Concerning the Decision to Send Troops into Korea for Combat, October 2, 1950, in Thomas J. Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Telegrams,” *International Security* Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), 151; “Ciphred Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin),” October 13, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, listy 1-2. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113743>; Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 320; Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into the Korean War,” *Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 1* (June 1992), 25-34; John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 78-82; Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War*, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 87; Andrew Scobell, *China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 86, 89-90, 92-93; Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, *After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 48-49; Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988-1989), 50-91.

foreign investment control were instituted in Guatemala in 1951, with growing influence of the Communist Party. The U.S. perceived this development as a threat to its influence in Latin America.”

Dien Bien Phu (1954)

Crisis Number: 145

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Non-State Actor (North Vietnam)

Region: Southeast Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis was part of the ongoing French war in Indochina over the status of the French colony. The United States considered intervention to save the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu.⁸

Taiwan Strait I (1954)

Crisis Number: 146

Triggering Entity: Multi-state

Opponents: People’s Republic of China

Region: Central and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. Using the coding criteria in the main article there were no US FNDs in the region. The relaxed coding includes U.S. nuclear deployments in Japan (Okinawa) that began in 1954. I did not find evidence that the crisis was linked to these deployments or to future deployments elsewhere in Japan or Taiwan. Rather, the ICB summary of the crisis makes clear it was unrelated to nuclear issues: “A crisis for the PRC was triggered in early August 1954 by fear of the impending creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). It was formally established on 8 September. ... On 3 September 1954 the PRC bombarded the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. This triggered a crisis for the United States and Taiwan.” The PRC also feared the impending signing of a U.S.-Taiwan Defense Pact.⁹

Suez Nationalization War (1956)

Crisis Number: 152

Triggering Entity: Egypt

Opponents: Egypt, Soviet Union

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have nuclear weapons in the region (Morocco) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis to begin with. Rather, the crisis was the result of the Egyptian decision to nationalize the Suez Canal and subsequent British-French-Israeli collusion to launch a war to retake the Canal. Israel invaded the Sinai on October 29. Britain and France then intervened on October 31, allegedly to separate the two sides from fighting but with the ulterior motive of overturning Egyptian control of the Canal. Egyptian Leader Nasser appealed to the Soviet Union and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev issued harsh statements, including what many perceived as nuclear threats, to the Western Powers. Khrushchev later claimed that his threats helped compel British and French withdrawal.

⁸ On U.S. intervention debates see Bradford Ian Stapleton, “The Korea Syndrome: An Examination of War-Weariness Theory,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 2015), 36-81.

⁹ For additional discussion see M. Taylor Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 233-241.

In reality, the United States exerted strong pressure on Britain and France to withdraw.¹⁰ President Dwight Eisenhower was furious that the operation had taken place without consultation with the United States and against expressed American desires.

Syria-Turkey Confrontation (1957)

Crisis Number: 159

Triggering Entity: Syria

Opponents: Syria

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have nuclear weapons in the region (Morocco) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis to begin with. The ICB summary concludes that the crisis was the result of deepening ties between Syria and the Soviet Union over the course of several years. The appointment of a pro-Soviet military official “to Chief of Staff of Syria's armed forces ... triggered a crisis for Turkey and the U.S., which feared that Syria had now moved into the Soviet camp.” This led the United States to reaffirm the “Eisenhower Doctrine, whereby the U.S. would come to the assistance of any Middle East state threatened by ‘international communism.’”

Aborted Coup in Indonesia (1958)*

Crisis Number: 164

Triggering Entity: Non-state actor

Opponents: Indonesia

Region: Southeast Asia

Related to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have nuclear weapons in the region (Philippines). The ICB summary concludes that the crisis was the result of ongoing internal instability in Indonesia and fear of a coup. Perception of U.S. supplies for the rebels and then fear that the United States might intervene with conventional forces on the side of the rebels caused greater concern within the Indonesia government. The United States assured Indonesia it had no intention of intervening “what was an internal Indonesian affair.”

Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval (1958)

Crisis Number: 165

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Iraq / non-state actors

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have nuclear weapons in the region (Morocco) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis to begin with. The ICB discussion notes that the crisis was largely due to internal instability in Lebanon following the May murder of a pro-communist journalist and the July 14 coup in Iraq that overthrew the Hashemite monarchy. This domestic-situation led the United States to deploy forces to Lebanon.

Taiwan Strait II (1958)

Crisis Number: 166

¹⁰ On this point see Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 236.

Triggering Entity: People's Republic of China

Opponents: People's Republic of China

Region: Central and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: Borderline

Discussion: See discussion in article. In addition to that discussion, the United States did deploy nuclear weapons in Japan (Okinawa, Chichi Jima, and Iwo Jima) at this time. However, I found no evidence to suggest that Chinese concern with these deployments, to the extent they were aware of such deployments, drove Chinese decision making.

Berlin Deadline (1958)

Crisis Number: 168

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: Yes

Discussion: See discussion in article.

Pathet Lao Offensive (1961)

Crisis Number: 180

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Region: Southeast Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have nuclear weapons in the region (Philippines). The crisis was the result of ongoing instability in former-Indochina following the French withdrawal and prior to major American military involvement during the Vietnam War. The ICB summary concludes: "A crisis for the United States was triggered on 9 March 1961 when Pathet Lao troops, with Vietminh support, launched a major offensive breaking through the Laotian government defenses in central Laos, severing the key road junction between Vientiane and Luang Prabang. ... President Kennedy felt that, if Laos were to be abandoned, the communists would hold the north-south road along the Mekong lowlands from which stronger pressure would be mounted against South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand."

Bay of Pigs (1961)

Crisis Number: 181

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor (United States)

Opponents: Cuba

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Nuclear deployments on the U.S. homeland and territories could already strike Cuba. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of covert U.S. actions to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime. U.S. concern stemmed from Castro's pro-communist leaning and growing Cuban-Soviet ties.¹¹

Berlin Wall (1961)

¹¹ For a historical overview see Howard Jones, *The Bay of Pigs* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

Crisis Number: 185
Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor (Soviet Union)
Opponents: Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic
Region: Europe
Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: Yes
Discussion: See discussion in article.

Vietcong Attack (1961)

Crisis Number: 186
Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor
Opponents: Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Region: Southeast Asia
Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No
Discussion: The United States did have nuclear weapons in the region (Philippines). The crisis was the result of ongoing instability in former-Indochina following the French withdrawal and prior to major American military involvement during the Vietnam War. The ICB summary concludes: "A crisis for South Vietnam and the United States was triggered on 18 September 1961 when Phuoc Vinh, the provincial capital of Phuoc Thanh, only 55 miles from Saigon, was captured and held for a day by the Vietcong."

Nam Tram (1962)

Crisis Number: 193
Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor
Opponents: Non-State Actor (Democratic Republic of Vietnam)
Region: Southeast Asia
Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No
Discussion: The United States did have nuclear weapons in the region (Philippines). The crisis was the result of ongoing instability in former-Indochina following the French withdrawal and prior to major American military involvement during the Vietnam War. The ICB summary concludes: "A crisis for Thailand and the United States was triggered on 6 May 1962 when a heavy Pathet Lao attack was launched against Nam Tha."

Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

Crisis Number: 196
Triggering Entity: Soviet Union
Opponents: Cuba, Soviet Union
Region: North America and Caribbean
Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: Yes
Discussion: See discussion in article.

Dominican Republic-Haiti II (1963)*

Crisis Number: 198
Triggering Entity: Haiti
Opponents: Haiti
Region: North America and Caribbean
Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of fear in both the Dominican Republic and Haiti that the other was attempting to undermine their hold on political power. The ICB summary concludes: “On 26 April 1963 Haitian policemen forcibly entered the Dominican Republic embassy and arrested opponents of Haiti's regime. This violation of diplomatic immunity triggered a crisis for the Dominican Republic.”

Panama Flag (1964)

Crisis Number: 206

Triggering Entity: United States

Opponents: Panama

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the area (Canada) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis. The dispute centered on control of the Panama Canal. The ICB summary concludes: “On 9 January 1964 a group of U.S. students in the Canal Zone raised the U.S. flag at Balboa High School. Massive rioting followed and was met by force: U.S. troops fired upon the Panamanian demonstrators, killing 26 and wounding 100, triggering a crisis for Panama.”

Gulf of Tonkin (1964)

Crisis Number: 210

Triggering Entity: Republic of Vietnam

Opponents: Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Region: Southeast Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have nuclear weapons in the region (Philippines). The crisis was the result of ongoing instability in former-Indochina following the French withdrawal and prior to major American military involvement during the Vietnam War. Following U.S.-backed covert raids on North Vietnamese coastal targets, North Vietnamese torpedo boats engaged the U.S. destroyer U.S.S. *Maddox* on August 2, 1964. A second attack claimed by the United States on August 4 likely never happened. Nevertheless, President Lyndon Johnson administration used the dual attacks to attain a Joint Resolution from the Congress approving the use of force in Southeast Asia. This provided the legal justification necessary for the subsequent increase in U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.¹²

Congo II (1964)

Crisis Number: 211

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Soviet Union

Region: Sub-Saharan Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather,

¹² In addition to the ICB Crisis Summary for this incident this discussion also draws on John Prados, “Essay: 40th Anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident,” August 4, 2004, The National Security Archive, at: <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/essay.htm>. Accessed December 9, 2015.

the crisis was the result of ongoing political instability with the Congo with the United States and Soviet Union backing opposing sides.

Pleiku (1965)

Crisis Number: 213

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Region: Southeast Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Philippines). The crisis was part of the increasing involvement in what would become the Vietnam War. The ICB summary concludes: "A crisis for the United States and South Vietnam was triggered on 7 February 1965 when Vietcong guerrillas staged a night raid against U.S. and South Vietnam army barracks at Pleiku, killing eight and wounding 126. The U.S. response was a decision by President Johnson on the 13th, following a meeting of his National Security Council, in favor of measured and limited air action jointly with South Vietnam against selected military targets in North Vietnam."

Dominican Intervention (1965)

Crisis Number: 215

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Dominican Republic

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Canada) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis. The crisis was the result of political instability within the Dominican Republic. Supporters of ousted President Juan Bosch overthrew a military junta which itself had overthrown the Bosch regime in 1963. The United States intervened to evacuate U.S. citizens and restore order.

Six Day War (1967)

Crisis Number: 222

Triggering Entity: Egypt

Opponents: Soviet Union

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). The crisis for the United States and Soviet Union however was the result of Soviet threats to intervene in the Six Day War to block further Israeli military advances following initial Israeli successes during war. The war itself was triggered by issues unrelated to foreign nuclear deployments. Specifically, Israel launched a preemptive strike against Egyptian forces in response to ongoing tensions and Egyptian force increases in the Sinai Peninsula.¹³

Pueblo (1968)

¹³ For discussions of the lead-up to the Six Day War, including miscalculations by both sides, see Richard B. Parker, *The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East*, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993); and Zeev Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006).

Crisis Number: 224

Triggering Entity: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Opponents: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Region: Central and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (South Korea) using the standard coding, and Japan (Okinawa) using the relaxed coding. As discussed in the article, the crisis was part of a series of more hostile acts at the end of the 1960s against South Korea and the United States that were unrelated to the American nuclear deployment.

Tet Offensive (1968)

Crisis Number: 225

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Region: Southeast Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have nuclear weapons in the region (Philippines). The crisis was the result of major Vietcong attacks throughout South Vietnam and was part of the ongoing U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

Vietnam Spring Offensive (1969)

Crisis Number: 230

Triggering Entity: Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Opponents: Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Region: Southeast Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have nuclear weapons in the region (Philippines). The crisis was the result of a North Vietnamese offensive on February 22, the day before Nixon was scheduled to visit South Vietnam. It was part of the ongoing U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

EC-121 Spy Plane (1969)

Crisis Number: 233

Triggering Entity: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Opponents: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Region: Central and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (South Korea) using the standard coding, and Japan (Okinawa) using the relaxed coding. As discussed in the article, the crisis was part of a series of more hostile acts at the end of the 1960s against South Korea and the United States that were unrelated to the American nuclear deployment.

Invasion of Cambodia (1970)

Crisis Number: 237

Triggering Entity: Cambodia

Opponents: Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Region: Southeast Asia

Related to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Philippines). The crisis was part of ongoing U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. North Vietnamese forces and Viet Cong had been using Cambodia as a base of operations. In march Cambodia demanding that foreign troops leave the country. U.S. troops entered Cambodia following communist forces attacked the town of Takeo in Cambodia. U.S. forces withdrew in June.

Black September (1970)

Crisis Number: 238

Triggering Entity: Jordan

Opponents: Syria

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). The crisis the result of ongoing political instability within Jordan and a desire by Jordanian leadership to confront Palestinian guerrilla forces. The ICB summary concludes: "A crisis for Syria and the U.S. was triggered on 15 September 1970 by King Hussein's announcement of a drastic change in his cabinet, which would now include military personnel. His intention to confront the PLO challenge seemed clear. The U.S. feared the loss of an ally if Hussein were overthrown, and Syria perceived a decline in its influence in the region if the Palestinians were defeated. Syria responded on 19 September by invading Jordan, triggering a crisis for Jordan and Israel."

Cienfuegos Submarine Base (1970)

Crisis Number: 239

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: Soviet Union

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: In September 1970 a brief, minor crisis flared over the construction of a Soviet naval facility in Cuba that could have hosted Soviet nuclear missile submarines.¹⁴ Soviet naval forces capable of delivering nuclear weapons occasionally visited Cuba after 1962. The discovery in late 1970 that the Soviets were building a naval base at Cienfuegos that might house Soviet naval forces armed with nuclear weapons caused some alarm in Washington.¹⁵ The deployment never occurred, though the Soviets occasionally probed the American position thereafter. Because the possible deployment centered on naval forces, specifically Soviet submarines, it does not meet the coding criteria for a foreign nuclear deployment (FND) and thus I did not include a discussion in the main article.

However, to the extent there was a crisis related to nuclear weapons it generally conforms to the features of my argument. Specifically, the deployment was in an area of vital interest to the United States and it did threaten to violate past agreements. American concern centered on these past agreements explicitly. At a NSC meeting on September 23, 1970 Nixon noted that "in his view, the new base would constitute a marginal strategic advantage."¹⁶ However, the Soviets had stated in August that they were

¹⁴ For general discussion of the crisis see Raymond L. Garthoff, "Handling the Cinefuegos Crisis," *International Security* Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), 46-66

¹⁵ Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, September 22, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. 2, 636-643.

¹⁶ Minutes of the National Security Council, September 23, 1970 *FRUS 1969-1976* Vol. 12, 652. See also Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, September 22, 1970, *ibid*, 638; and Kissinger's notes in Editorial Note, *ibid*, Vol. 13, 184.

adhering to the 1962 agreement regarding Cuba.¹⁷ The issue at stake, Henry Kissinger argued, was why had the Soviets gone “directly against the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1962 understandings?”¹⁸

The administration worked to avoid any sort of crisis atmosphere. Privately, it made clear to the Soviets that their actions were unacceptable. Nixon instructed that if the Soviets ignored these overtures then it was necessary to “consider the possibility of a new blockade [of Cuba] with surface ships and the possibility of mining the entrance to the harbor.”¹⁹ There was hope it would not come to that, but if it did the situation favored the United States. As Nixon remarked near the end of the meeting, “even though the strategic balance has changed drastically since 1962 the Soviets would never trade Russia for Havana.”²⁰

The issue was ultimately settled with little fuss. Kissinger raised the American concern with Dobrynin privately on September 25. On October 6 Dobrynin replied that the Soviets would do nothing in Cuba which would contradict the 1962 understanding. The Soviet Ambassador added that while submarines might occasionally visit Cuba they “would not call there in an operational capacity.”²¹ As Kissinger later pointed out, the Soviets had actually gone beyond the 1962 understanding, “which referred to offensive missiles and extended it to submarine bases.”²² When Nixon met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the end of October the Cuban issue was essentially ignored.²³

Invasion of Laos II (1971)*

Crisis Number: 241

Triggering Entity: Multi-state

Opponents: Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Laos

Region: Southeast Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No.

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Philippines). The crisis was part of ongoing U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. South Vietnamese forces invaded Laos in February 1971 to disrupt North Vietnamese operations, triggering a crisis for North Vietnam and Laos.

Vietnam Ports Mining (1972)

Crisis Number: 246

Triggering Entity: Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Opponents: Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Region: Southeast Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Philippines). The crisis was part of ongoing U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The ICB summary concludes: North Vietnam launched another spring offensive in South Vietnam on 30 March 1972, triggering a crisis for South Vietnam and the United States. ... The U.S. immediately renewed B-52 bombing of the Hanoi-

¹⁷ Kissinger Conversation with Vorontsov, August 4, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. 12, 588.

¹⁸ Minutes of the NSC, September 23, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976* Vol. 12, 651.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 652-653.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 653.

²¹ Memorandum of Conversation, October 6, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. 12, 670. See also Memorandum of Conversation, September 25, 1970, *ibid*, 663-664; Memorandum of Conversation, October 9, 1970, *ibid*, 681-685; Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, October 14, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976* Vol. 13, 23-28.

²² Editorial Note, 182-183, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. 13, 182-183.

²³ Memorandum of Conversation, October 22, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. 13, 86-101; Memorandum of Conversation, October 23, 1970, *ibid*, 119.

Haiphong industrial complex. Despite these bombings, the North Vietnamese undertook further escalation ... The major U.S. response was an order by President Nixon on 8 May to mine all North Vietnamese ports in an effort to prevent military shipments from reaching North Vietnam by sea.”

Christmas Bombing (1972)

Crisis Number: 249

Triggering Entity: United States

Opponents: Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Region: Southeast Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Philippines). The crisis was part of ongoing U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Following a breakdown in negotiations with North Vietnam the United States began renewed intense bombing of “the Hanoi-Haiphong military complex.”

October War (1973)

Crisis Number: 255

Triggering Entity: Multi-state

Opponents: Soviet Union, Egypt, Syria

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). The initial war was the result of ongoing Egyptian and Syrian inability to reacquire territory lost in the 1967 Six Day War. Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat launched the assault in the hopes of galvanizing international, particularly U.S., pressure on Israel to negotiate over the territories. Egyptian and Syrian refusal of a cease-fire in place on October 12 led to greater U.S. involvement in the form of supplies. Following Israeli violations of a cease-fire agreement on October 22 and the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army the Soviet Union sent a note to the United States outlining the possibility of Soviet intervention which led to a modest U.S. increase in its nuclear alert status.²⁴

Mayaguez (1975)

Crisis Number: 259

Triggering Entity: Cambodia

Opponents: Cambodia

Region: Southeast Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Philippines). However, the weapons were distant making it unlikely that they were the cause of the crisis. In addition, the crisis was not the result of fears of an impending American FND. Rather, the crisis occurred when the new Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia seized the U.S. registered cargo ship Mayaguez.

War in Angola (1975)

Crisis Number: 260

²⁴ For general overviews of the campaign see Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002). For a Soviet account see Victor Israelyan, *Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War* (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). For initial motives see Craig Daigle, *The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor
Opponents: Soviet Union, Cuba, Angola
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of the breakdown in the Alvor Agreement which granted independence to Angola. Fighting began between U.S. backed anti-communist forces and Soviet and Cuban backed pro-communist forces. The ICB summary concludes: "There was intense foreign involvement in the Angolan War. Cuba, the Soviet Union, Congo (Brazzaville), and Yugoslavia actively supported the MPLA, with Cuban forces directly engaged in combat. The United States, China, North Korea, and Zaire aided the FNLA; Zaire, in addition to extensive diplomatic activity, provided military bases on its territory."

Poplar Tree (1976)

Crisis Number: 274

Triggering Entity: Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Opponents: Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Region: Central and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (South Korea). The crisis was not the result of a new nuclear deployment or fears of impending changes. Rather, the confrontation arose due to a brief skirmish in the demilitarized zone between military patrols. The ICB summary concludes: "On 17 August, in a scuffle between forces of the UN Command and the North Korean People's Army, two U.S. soldiers were killed and nine wounded in the JSA of the DMZ: they were members of a group of 15 who had entered the area to prune the poplar tree. This triggered a crisis for the United States. ... The U.S. military response, though non-violent, triggered a crisis for North Korea on the 19th. Kim Il-Sung responded the same day with an order for a war posture by the Korean People's Army, reserves, and all auxiliary forces."

Shaba II (1978)

Crisis Number: 292

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor
Opponents: Angola
Region: Sub-Saharan Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of ongoing instability in the Angolan conflict. The ICB summary concludes: "On 14 May a crisis was triggered for Belgium, France, and the U.S. when their governments were informed of a massacre of French and Belgian citizens working in the mines, and of the danger facing the white community in Zaire. The U.S. viewed the events in Zaire as threatening its influence in the international system."

Afghanistan Invasion (1979)

Crisis Number: 303

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor
Opponents: Soviet Union
Region: Central and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (South Korea) but they played no role in the crisis. The ICB codes the crisis as beginning for the Soviet Union in March 1979 and ending on December 27, 1979 shortly after their invasion. As I discuss below, the origins of the crisis were not driven by U.S. FNDs elsewhere. However, the final Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in December 1979 occurred at roughly the same time as the NATO decision on the INF-deployments. As a result, one might argue that even if American FNDs did not precipitate the initial crisis, the possibility of new-FND deployments to an area of core Soviet concern, West Germany, caused the Soviets to escalate the crisis. Indeed, as Vladislav Zubok puts it, “the ‘last straw’ that tipped the scales in favor of intervention was NATO’s decision to employ a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons in Western Europe—Pershing missiles and cruise missiles.”²⁵ As I argue in the main article, my argument does predict strong Soviet opposition to the American INF-deployment to West Germany given Soviet perceptions of the military balance. I coded the Able Archer crisis as a borderline case of an-FND driven crisis because, while tensions were very high at that time, there are reasons to doubt that Able Archer should actually be considered a crisis. The Afghanistan crisis was a crisis for both sides. I do not code it as a FND-driven crisis for three reasons: the crisis for Moscow began for reasons unrelated to any American-FND; Soviet military and clandestine involvement increased for reasons independent of the NATO INF-decision; and the INF decision was then used instrumentally by proponents of greater military intervention. In short, FNDs did not cause the initial crisis or shape its trajectory. I expand on these points below.

As noted, the crisis began for Moscow in March 1979. The impetus for the crisis was events inside Afghanistan. On March 15, 1979 a diverse group of rebels seized control of the western city of Herat. Large numbers of government troops in the area deserted and sided with the rebels.²⁶ After initially downplaying the severity of the problem, on March 18 the Afghani leader Nur Mohammad Taraki begged Politburo Member and Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin to send Soviet troops. When Kosygin demurred, Taraki suggested that they “place Afghan markings on your tanks and aircraft and no one will be any the wiser.”²⁷ Soviet leaders were alarmed and discussed the situation at length during emergency Politburo meetings on March 17-19.²⁸ On March 17 they took turns stating the importance of a friendly regime in Afghanistan: Gromyko: “under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan;” Kosygin: “We must put up a struggle for Afghanistan; after all, we have lived side by side for 60 years;” Andropov: “under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan;” Kosygin: “All of us agree – we must not surrender Afghanistan.”²⁹ The meeting also raised the possibility of introducing troops. On March 18 and 19, the

²⁵ Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009[2007]), 263. Zubok draws here from Lyakhovsky. For an English version of one of his works that contains this reference see Alexander Antonovich Liakhovsky, “Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Seizure of Kabul, December 1979,” trans. Gary Goldber and Artemy Kalinovsky, *Cold War International History Project*, Working Paper #51 (January 2007), 20. See also James Graham Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 46; John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 211.

²⁶ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 306-307.

²⁷ “Telephone Conversation between Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin and Afghan Premier Nur Mohammed Taraki,” 18 March, 1979 [Excerpt], *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, (CWIHP) No. 14/15 (Winter 2003-Spring 2004), 236-238, quote at 237. For the lack of initial Afghan concern, see “Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” 17 March, 1979, in *Documents on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, CWIHP, e-Dossier No. 4 (November, 2001), 136-140.

²⁸ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 308.

²⁹ “Meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union,” 17 March, 1979, in *Documents on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, CWIHP, e-Dossier No. 4 (November, 2001), 136-140.

latter meeting attended by Brezhnev, they stopped short of deploying ground troops but agreed to substantially increase their military and economic support of the Afghan government. Brezhnev outlined the extent of Soviet support to Taraki on March 20.³⁰ The Soviets did, however, provide air support which helped the Afghan army to put down the revolt on March 19.³¹ Later, in June, the Politburo decided to dispatch “a battalion to Bagram Airforce Base outside Kabul and ‘special detachments’ of the KGB and GRU to Bagram and to the Soviet embassy compound.”³² In short, Soviet military involvement increased well before the final December decision to intervene with large numbers of ground troops.

The political situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate, though. Soviet fears centered on a series of interrelated concerns unrelated to FNDs including an expanding civil war, the Iranian revolution, a leadership struggle between Taraki and his deputy Hafizullah Amin, and possible American encroachment. Following Herat, a “full-scale civil war” emerged between Islamist opposition and Afghan communists.³³ The Islamist threat had already caused Moscow to increase military support beginning in early 1979.³⁴ The growing prominence of Iranian Islamists following the ouster of the Shah exacerbated the problem. Westad summarizes an October KGB report that argued the Islamic Republic sought to “weaken the Afghan regime, exert influence on the Muslim republics in the Soviet Union, and prevent the spread of Communism in the region.”³⁵ Or, as Jonathan Haslam writes, “Deputy Chairman of the KGB Tsinev in October pointed out that [Iranian leader] Khomeini was set upon overturning the regime in Kabul and spreading Islam through the southern crescent of the USSR.”³⁶ Soviet leaders, notes Liakhovsky, “reacted with alarm ... to the statements of Islamic fundamentalists that if they came to power [in Afghanistan] they would carry the struggle to the territory of Soviet Central Asian republics under Islamic slogans.”³⁷ Though such aspirations were unrealistic, the Soviet leaders had reason to worry about the implications that the growing religious movement might have for stability in their own territories.

The Iranian Revolution also increased fears of American encroachment if the Communist government of Afghanistan fell. Soviet leaders worried that the United States would try to offset its losses in Iran by gaining a foothold in Afghanistan. Soviet General Valentin Varennikov later recalled that “we were concerned that if the United States were forced from Iran, they would move their bases to Pakistan and seize Afghanistan.”³⁸ Though I am not aware of any American plans to seize Afghanistan, CIA experts apparently did look at moving some electronic intelligence facilities to Afghanistan in 1979.³⁹ Moreover, Washington did provide some scattered evidence the Soviets could seize upon to fuel their concern. On July 3 U.S. National Security Advisor Brzezinski convinced President Carter to “offer direct aid for the rebels in Afghanistan.”⁴⁰ The United States began increasing its forces in the Persian Gulf following the Iranian seizure of the American embassy in November 1979. Some American hints of overtures to Amin

³⁰ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 309-310. For the text of Brezhnev’s meeting with Taraki discussing Soviet support see Record of Meeting of A.N. Kosygin, A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov, and B.N. Ponomarev with N.M. Taraki,” 20 March, 1979, in CWIHP e-Dossier No. 4, 146-150. Taraki kept up pressure for direct Soviet military involvement but the Soviet leaders continued to rebuff his entreaties.

³¹ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 307-308, 324.

³² Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 311

³³ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 310.

³⁴ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 324

³⁵ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 315. See also Ibid., 323; Liakhovsky, “Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Seizure of Kabul, December 1979,” 27.

³⁶ Haslam, *Russia’s Cold War*, 324

³⁷ Liakhovsky, “Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Seizure of Kabul, December 1979,” 29.

³⁸ Quoted in Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 262

³⁹ Rodric Braithwaite, *Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 78.

⁴⁰ Jonathan Haslam, *Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 324.

may have been deliberate. “When news reached Brzezinski in Washington,” of the Soviet invasion, Haslam writes, the National Security Advisor “shot his fist into the air triumphally: ‘They have taken the bait!’ In his note to Carter that day Brzezinski jubilantly remarked: ‘We now have the opportunity to give the USSR its Vietnam War.’ As the official history of the NSA notes: ‘This time there was no ‘intelligence failure.’”⁴¹ This reaction was by no means universal and the general American reaction was one of alarm.

Before the final decision to invade, Soviet leaders had come to see the leadership struggle within the Afghan government as the root of the problem. They viewed Amin with disdain, believing him an obstacle to stabilizing the situation and completely unwilling to follow Soviet advice. By July at the latest Soviet officials were trying “to get Taraki to purge Amin from the Afghan leadership.”⁴² On his way to a meeting with Taraki and Soviet representatives on September 14 guards opened fire on Amin, killing two of his assistants but leaving the prime minister himself unharmed. Amin naturally suspected Soviet involvement.⁴³ Amin had been maneuvering for some time against Taraki and quickly moved to remove the Afghan leader. Amin then had the Party Plenum and Revolutionary Council declare him General Secretary of the Party and Chair of the Revolutionary Council.⁴⁴ President of Afghanistan and head of the Communist Party. Taraki was executed on October 9.⁴⁵

The ascension of Amin and death of Taraki proved to be the key event that caused the crisis to escalate. “It was President Taraki’s murder by his second-in-command Hafizullah Amin in October which set the Soviet leadership on the course to intervention,” argues Westad.⁴⁶ Or, as Braithwaite put it: “The murder of Taraki was the crucial turning point in the Soviet decision-making process.”⁴⁷ Brezhnev was particularly upset. The Soviet leader had met with Taraki in September as the latter returned from a non-aligned movement summit in Cuba. There Brezhnev had “promised him aid and support.”⁴⁸ “What kind of scum is this Amin—to strangle the man with whom he participated in the revolution?” Brezhnev allegedly asked. “What will people say in other countries? Can one trust Brezhnev’s words?”⁴⁹ Taraki’s murder had called into question Soviet credibility itself. General Aleksander Liakhovskii recalled after Taraki’s death “Brezhnev’s attitude to the entire issue had changed. He could not forgive Amin, because Brezhnev had personally assured Taraki that he would be able to help him. And then they disregarded Brezhnev completely and murdered Taraki. Brezhnev used to say, ‘how should the world be able to believe what Brezhnev says, if his words do not count in Afghanistan.’”⁵⁰ Beyond that, though, as Braithwaite notes, “Soviet influence in Kabul was now practically non-existent. . . . It was a challenge that the Soviets could hardly leave unanswered. One of the driving forces in Soviet policymaking over the next three months was a determination to recover from humiliation and reassert control over events.”⁵¹ It was at this point in October, then, that Alexandrov-Agentov, a foreign policy assistant to Brezhnev, “told one official of the International Department that it was necessary to send troops to Afghanistan.”⁵² No

⁴¹ Haslam, *Russia’s Cold War*, 326

⁴² Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 311.

⁴³ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 313

⁴⁴ Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 68.

⁴⁵ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 313.

⁴⁶ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 316. Reports of Taraki’s death vary somewhat. Haslam, *Russia’s Cold War*, 323 reports that Amin had Taraki shot on October 8. Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 262, contends that Amin ordered Taraki strangled on October 9. Regardless of the particular method, on October 8-9 Amin had Taraki killed.

⁴⁷ Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 73.

⁴⁸ Quoted in Liakhovskii, “Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Seizure of Kabul, December 1979,” 17.

⁴⁹ Quoted in Haslam, *Russia’s Cold War*, 262.

⁵⁰ Quoted in Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 319.

⁵¹ Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 73-74.

⁵² Haslam, *Russia’s Cold War*, 262.

formal decision had been made, but planning began for a possible intervention into Afghanistan by the Soviet military chiefs of staff had begun.⁵³

Soviet leaders, already skeptical of Amin and fearful of his possible ties to the United States, began to play up evidence linking the Afghani leader with the Americans. The KGB, led by Andropov, had led several unsuccessful attempts to remove Amin. Brezhnev let his dissatisfaction with Andropov be known. Stories highlighting Amin's ties with Washington increased and with it the conclusion that it was necessary to remove Amin from power.⁵⁴ There was scattered evidence, though some quite tenuous, that Amin did seek closer ties with the West and the United States cultivated a relationship.⁵⁵ The KGB worried that Amin would do "a Sadat on us" if left in power, kicking the Russians out and inviting the Americans to place "their control and intelligence centers close to our most sensitive borders."⁵⁶ It did not escape Soviet attention that the Americans had recently lost similar facilities in Iran and might be eager to replace them.⁵⁷ The Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov was coming to similar conclusions at the same time. "At some point in October and November," Zubok concludes, "Andropov supported Ustinov's position and the two began to plot an invasion."⁵⁸ Ustinov sought a sizeable force – at least 75,000 – to make certain the effort to topple Amin succeeded smoothly and be able to secure Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan and Iran to limit "outside support for the Afghan Islamist guerrillas."⁵⁹ The KGB was ready with a replacement for Amin, calling on the exiled Babrak Karmal – then in Czechoslovakia – to be the new leader.

On December 6, Andropov and Ustinov finalized their plans. The key then was to secure Brezhnev's support. Sometime earlier that month Andropov had written a lengthy note to Brezhnev highlighting the potential ties between Amin and Washington.⁶⁰ On December 8 Andropov and Ustinov met with Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Suslov and cited a laundry list of reasons necessitating intervention. These included, according to Liakhovsky: "the efforts of the US CIA (particularly Paul Henze, the Chief of Station in Ankara) to create a 'New Great Ottoman Empire' including the southern republics of the USSR; the lack of a reliable air defense system in the south and thus, in case American 'Pershing' missiles were stationed in the DRA [Afghansitan], many vitally important regions such as the Baykonur Cosmodrome would be placed in jeopardy; the possibility of the use of Afghan uranium deposits by Pakistan and Iran to create a nuclear weapons [sic]; the establishment of an opposition government in the northern regions of Afghanistan; the joining of this region to Pakistan..."⁶¹ They agreed to consider two options, removing Amin with KGB capabilities only or, if that failed, sending in troops. Thus, while possible American FNDs – this time to Afghanistan – were discussed at the critical December 8 meeting it seems likely they were added simply to bolster the case for military intervention driven primarily by a desire to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. Even absent the highly unlikely – and in no way planned – FND, the Soviets would likely have acted. Indeed, highlighting the centrality of Amin, Liakhovsky adds that if the limited operation "had been conducted successfully it would not have been necessary to

⁵³ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 316.

⁵⁴ Liakhovsky, "Inside the Soviet Invasion of the Seizure of Kabul, December 1979," 17.

⁵⁵ Haslam, *Russia's Cold War*, 324-325; Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 319-320. On tenuous nature of evidence see Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 263

⁵⁶ Quoted in Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 316

⁵⁷ Haslam, *Russia's Cold War*, 324.

⁵⁸ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 262.

⁵⁹ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 320.

⁶⁰ For the text of the note see Personal Memorandum, Andropov to Brezhnev, n.d. [early December 1979], CWIHP Bulletin 8/9, 159.

⁶¹ Liakhovsky, "Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Seizure of Kabul, December 1979," 17. Braithwaite places this list by Andropov at the Politburo meeting on December 12. Regardless of the timing, they were used to convince possible holdouts of the importance of intervening. As Braithwaite writes: "Andropov made particular play with the stories of Amin's increasing contacts with the West." Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 77-78.

introduce Soviet troops into the DRA.”⁶² Westad concludes that “Brezhnev himself seemed to have genuinely believed that the intervention would be a ‘limited operation’ and that ‘it would be over in a few weeks’ time.’ Since the main purpose of the operation was to remove the Amin leadership, Brezhnev expected that the situation in Afghanistan would begin to stabilize as soon as that aim had been achieved.”⁶³ In any event, after the December 8 meeting Ustinov met with the Defense Ministry’s senior staff and ordered them to prepare for an intervention.⁶⁴ The Politburo officially approved the decision to intervene on December 12.

“Later commentators have made much of the coincidence that NATO’s decision to deploy Pershing II missiles in Europe was taken on the same day as the Politburo took its fateful decision on Afghanistan,” writes Braithwaite. “Given the complex and confused way in which decisions are taken by most governments, it is unlikely that the news would have had much effect on the Politburo, even if it had reached them in time.”⁶⁵ At most, the INF debates and decision was one of many factors contributing to the deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relationship at the end of the 1970s that may have led some Soviet leaders to be less worried about negative American reactions to Soviet escalation in Afghanistan.⁶⁶ That is a far different claim than asserting that the American INF offer was the ‘last straw’ that led the Soviets to escalate the crisis. The crisis and Soviet actions were driven by events in Afghanistan and fears of broader strategic challenges independent of FNDs. In other words, had NATO not decided to employ Pershing-IIs and GLCMs to West Germany in December 1979 the crisis would have unfolded along the same lines. Conversely, had the Soviets been satisfied with Afghanistan’s leadership there would have been no crisis in Afghanistan even with the NATO INF decision.

US Hostages in Iran (1979)

Crisis Number: 309

Triggering Entity: Iran

Opponents: Iran

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). The crisis was the result of the overthrow of the U.S.-backed Shah of Iran. On November 4 Iranian protesters stormed the U.S. embassy and took the Americans hostage. After negotiations failed President Jimmy Carter authorized a covert raid to recover the hostages that failed.

Gulf of Syrte, I (1981)*

Crisis Number: 330

Triggering Entity: United States

Opponents: Libya

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis. Libya claimed sovereignty over the Gulf of Syrte. The United States recognized only the 12-mile limit to Libya’s Territorial Waters. The ICB summary concludes: “A crisis for Libya was triggered by a U.S. announcement on 12 August 1981 that

⁶² Ibid, 21.

⁶³ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 325

⁶⁴ Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 321.

⁶⁵ Braithwaite, *Afgantsy*, 78.

⁶⁶ Even then, the scope of the American reaction seemed to surprise the Soviet leadership.

its Sixth Fleet would hold maneuvers in the Mediterranean. Libya responded with a full military alert the same day. And on the 18th it accused the U.S. of violating Libya's territorial waters by holding naval exercises within the Gulf of Syrte.”

Libya Threat to Sudan (1983)*

Crisis Number: 340

Triggering Entity: Libya

Opponents: Libya

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis. The crisis was the result of ongoing disputes between Libya and the Sudan, the latter backed by the United States. The ICB summary concludes: “Evidence of a Libya military buildup and the perception in Khartoum and Cairo, by 11 February, of a Libyan plan to overthrow the Numeiri regime triggered a crisis for Sudan and Egypt. The next day Sudan complained to the UN and placed its forces on alert.”

Invasion of Grenada 1983

Crisis Number: 343

Triggering Entity: Grenada

Opponents: Cuba, Grenada

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Canada) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis. The crisis was the result of ongoing U.S. concerns about the leftist regime in Grenada and its ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Following the death of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and imposition of a curfew by Grenada’s military authorities “Washington perceived a threat to its influence in the Caribbean and Central America, along with potential harm to U.S. citizens living in Grenada, about 1,000, mostly university students.” The United States subsequently dispatched troops to the island.

Able Archer (1983)*

Crisis Number: 344

Triggering Entity: United States

Opponents: Soviet Union

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: Borderline

Discussion: See discussion in article.

Omdurman Bombing (1984)*

Crisis Number: 350

Triggering Entity: Libya

Opponents: Libya

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis. The crisis was the result of a single bomber attacking near Sudan's capital which generated a crisis for the Sudan and Egypt and led the United States to some minor involvement in the dispute through support of Sudan and Egypt against Libya.

Nicaragua MIG-21S (1984)

Crisis Number: 354

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: Soviet Union, Nicaragua

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Canada) at the beginning of the year but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis. The crisis began when reports surfaced that a Soviet cargo ship was "en route to Nicaragua carrying MIG-21s for the Sandinista regime." The United States intensified military exercises and U.S. naval patrols.

Gulf of Syrte II (1986)

Crisis Number: 363

Triggering Entity: United States

Opponents: Libya

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis. Libya claimed the Gulf of Syrte but the United States recognized most of it as international waters. In 1986 the U.S. announced naval maneuvers into the area. The ICB summary concludes: "Libya, perceiving this act as a grave threat to its territorial integrity, fired two Soviet-made SAM-5 missiles on U.S. carrier-based planes, causing no damage." Several bombings of civilian targets followed after which the U.S. executed air strikes against Tripoli and Benghazi.

Contras III (1988)*

Crisis Number: 383

Triggering Entity: Nicaragua

Opponents: Nicaragua

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of ongoing political instability inside Nicaragua and ongoing U.S. involvement backing Honduras and the contras.

Libyan Jets (1988)

Crisis Number: 386

Triggering Entity: Libya

Opponents: Libya

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis. The crisis was the result of ongoing disputes between Libya and the United States (see Crisis 330 and 363 above). The ICB summary concludes: “A crisis for the U.S. was triggered by the crash of a Pan American plane over Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21 December 1988.”

Invasion of Panama (1989)

Crisis Number: 391

Triggering Entity: Panama

Opponents: Panama

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the ICB background concludes: “the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989 was the culmination of a prolonged U.S. covert campaign, which coincided with a two-and-a-half-year domestic political crisis within Panama.” The United States “enunciated four reasons for the invasion: to safeguard the lives of U.S. citizens in Panama; to defend democracy in Panama; to apprehend Noriega and to bring him to trial on charges of direct involvement in drug trafficking from South America to the United States; and to ensure the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties.”

Gulf War (1990)

Crisis Number: 393

Triggering Entity: Iraq

Opponents: Iraq

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). The crisis was the result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. That invasion was the result of several factors, including Iraqi belief in a U.S.-Kuwaiti conspiracy to lower oil prices and the Iraqi need to revitalize its flailing economy following the devastating Iran-Iraq War.⁶⁷

Iraq No Fly Zone (1992)

Crisis Number: 406

Triggering Entity: Multi-state

Opponents: Iraq

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). The crisis was the result of ongoing U.S.-Iraqi tensions following the Gulf War. In response to central government repression of Iraq’s Shiites in the south of Iraq an international coalition created a no-fly

⁶⁷ For additional discussion of Iraqi motives and behavior see Kevin M. Woods, *The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008); and Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki, and Mark E. Stout, *The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime 1978-2001* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

zone, similar to what existed in the north to safeguard Iraq's Kurds. The announcement and dispatch of aircraft triggered a crisis for Iraq, "which perceived a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity."

North Korea Nuclear I (1993)

Crisis Number: 408

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Region: Central, South, and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States withdrew its foreign-deployed nuclear weapons from the region in 1991-92. In addition, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of disagreements between the IAEA, the United States, and South Korea on the one side and North Korea on the other about the status of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. See the discussion in the article regarding North Korean nuclear proliferation program.

Haiti Military Regime (1994)

Crisis Number: 411

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Haiti

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of ongoing political instability in Haiti following the ouster of democratically elected Jean Bertrand Aristide. The United States and United Nations intervened, with the United States ultimately landing U.S. troops in Haiti.

Iraq Troop Deployment-Kuwait (1994)

Crisis Number: 412

Triggering Entity: Iraq

Opponents: Iraq

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). The crisis was the result of ongoing U.S.-Iraqi tensions following the Gulf War. Iraq remained hostile to economic sanctions. Iraq began deploying troops near the border with Kuwait in early October, leading to a crisis for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. The United States moved naval and ground forces to the area in response.

Taiwan Strait IV (1995)*

Crisis Number: 415

Triggering Entity: Multi-state

Opponents: People's Republic of China

Region: Central, South, and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather,

the crisis was caused by ongoing concern in the People's Republic of China over the status of Taiwan. The U.S. State Department announcement that it would allow Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States effectively reversed "the US policy restricting high-level contacts between US officials and Taiwanese leaders, over the objections of Chinese officials. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian argued that the US action violated three joint agreements between the China and the US, represented a violation of Chinese sovereignty, and destroyed hopes of a peaceful resolution between mainland China and Taiwan."

Desert Strike (1996)

Crisis Number: 419

Triggering Entity: Iraq

Opponents: Iraq

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). The crisis was the result of ongoing U.S.-Iraqi tensions following the Gulf War. Iraqi forces intervened in the conflict between Kurdish factions in the north of Iraq. The United States viewed this in violation of earlier agreements and began air strikes.

UNSCOM I (1997)

Crisis Number: 422

Triggering Entity: Iraq

Opponents: Iraq

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). The crisis was the result of ongoing U.S.-Iraqi tensions following the Gulf War. The crisis began when Iraq "expelled all US inspectors working with UNSCOM [United Nations Special Commission]."

U.S. Embassy Bombings (1998)

Crisis Number: 427

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Sudan, Afghanistan

Region: Middle East and North Africa and Central, South, and East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in one of the regions (Turkey – Middle East and North Africa). The crisis was the result of al-Qaeda strikes against U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The United States attacked suspected al-Qaeda related facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan shortly thereafter. The crisis was one of the earliest in the ongoing U.S. dispute with al Qaeda.

UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox (1998)

Crisis Number: 429

Triggering Entity: Iraq

Opponents: Iraq

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). The crisis was the result of ongoing U.S.-Iraqi tensions following the Gulf War. The ICB summary concludes: “Following increased questions about the veracity of Iraq's claims that it has no chemical or biological weapons systems, Iraq announced that all UNSCOM activities in Iraq would come to an immediate halt. Cooperation would only resume, according to an Iraqi statement, after the Security Council reviewed the possibility of lifting sanctions on Iraq and after Richard Butler was removed as the UNSCOM chair. This announcement triggered a crisis for the UK and for the US.” The United States launched a series of debilitating air strikes that December.

Kosovo (1999)

Crisis Number: 429

Triggering Entity: Serbia (Yugoslavia)

Opponents: Serbia (Yugoslavia)

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Netherlands). The crisis was part of ongoing political instability in Serbia/Kosovo as a result of violence between the Kosovo Liberation Army claiming to represent ethnic Albanians and brutal responses by Serbian military and police. The failure to meet a negotiation deadline led to NATO members to use force to end the violence and force Serbian forces to withdraw from Kosovo.

Afghanistan-USA (2001)

Crisis Number: 434

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Afghanistan

Region: Central, South, and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of the al-Qaeda attack against New York City and Washington D.C. on September 11. This led to the launching by the President George W. Bush administration of the War on Terror. The first target was Afghanistan, where the Taliban regime in power had harbored al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden.

Iraq Regime Change (2002)

Crisis Number: 440

Triggering Entity: United States

Opponents: Iraq

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). The crisis was the result of ongoing U.S.-Iraqi tensions following the Gulf War and the new War on Terror following the terrorist attacks of September 11. Top Bush administration officials identified Iraq as part of the broader war on terror and (erroneously) believed Iraq had reconstituted its WMD program.⁶⁸ Failing

⁶⁸ For discussion of the politicization of the intelligence process, see Joshua Rovner, *Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), chap. 7. For an account of the

to attain what the administration thought was necessary Iraqi capitulation the United States launched an invasion in March 2003.

North Korea Nuclear II (2002)

Crisis Number: 441

Triggering Entity: United States

Opponents: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Region: Central, South, and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis was caused by ongoing disputes over the North Korean nuclear program. As the ICB background notes: "In a June 2002 assessment of the North Korean nuclear program, U.S. intelligence concluded that Pyongyang had begun a secret enrichment program. The CIA also publicly stated that North Korea was in the process of constructing a nuclear plant." On the origins of North Korea's nuclear program and its potential relation to earlier U.S. foreign-deployed nuclear weapons see discussion in the article.

Iran Nuclear I* (2003)

Crisis Number: 442

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Iran

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). The crisis was triggered by the June 13, 2003 report by the International Atomic Energy Agency that found "that Iran had not met all of its obligations under the Safeguards Agreements." Although the United States is not listed as a crisis actor in the Data Viewer the dyadic dataset codes the crisis beginning between Iran and the United States on this day. The United States took a hardline position throughout the crisis against any potential Iranian nuclear program. The United States had invaded Iraq earlier that year in part due to suspicions that Iraq was developing WMD, including nuclear weapons. Iran had been labeled by President George Bush as a fellow member of the Axis of Evil alongside Iraq and North Korea. In August 2003 the IAEA found traces of highly enriched uranium at Natanz, an Iranian nuclear plant. On October 21 Iran agreed to suspend uranium processing and enrichment and allow inspections IAEA unannounced inspections. Iran reiterated that pledge in a November 2004 agreement signed with the EU3 which ended the crisis. Throughout episode the EU3 – United Kingdom, France, and Germany – engaged in negotiations with Iran.

Iran Nuclear II (2006)

Crisis Number: 448

Triggering Entity: Iran

Opponents: Iran

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

lead-up to the war see Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, (London: Penguin Books, 2006).

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). The crisis was caused by ongoing disagreement about the status of Iran's nuclear enrichment program. The United States worried Iran was attempting to construct material for a nuclear weapon.

North Korea Nuclear III (2006)

Crisis Number: 450

Triggering Entity: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Opponents: North Korea

Region: Central, South, and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis was caused by ongoing disputes over the North Korean nuclear program. As the ICB summary concludes: "the United States obtained intelligence that North Korea was transporting a missile to a launch site. This information triggered a crisis for the United States. A few days after, North Korea announced that it intended to carry out a missile test. ... Despite international pressure, DPRK North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on 9 October 2006. Both the United States and South Korea confirmed DPRK's test after radioactive debris was detected in air samples around the site."

North Korea Nuclear IV: Satellite Launch (2009)

Crisis Number: 450

Triggering Entity: North Korea

Opponents: North Korea

Region: Central, South, and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments:

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region; the United States had withdrawn its FND from South Korea in 1991. Second, the crisis was not due to anticipated American FNDs. Rather, the crisis was not the result of new fears of FND introduction. Rather, the crisis was the result of ongoing disputes over North Korea's missile and nuclear programs. The immediate trigger for the crisis was the March 9 announcement and subsequent April 5 satellite launch. The United States and allies viewed this as a missile test in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1718 calling upon North Korea to "abandon its missile and nuclear programs." The United States and South Korea responded by conducting military exercises and deploying additional missile-intercept capabilities. UN condemnations led North Korea to withdraw from talks and expel IAEA monitors from its Yongbyon nuclear facility. Then, on May 25 North Korea tested a nuclear device underground resulting in widespread international condemnation and additional UN sanctions. Tensions slowly subsided and on August 4, 2009 North Korea released detained-US journalists following negotiations with former U.S. President Bill Clinton.

Libyan Civil War (2011)

Crisis Number: 464

Triggering Entity: Non-state actor

Opponents: Libya

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). However, those weapons were distant and there was no change in their status in 2011 that might have led to a crisis after years of Libya not acting in response to the American FND. Rather, the crisis was the

result of civil conflict within Libya. Mass demonstrations and protests began in Libya in January-February 2011. These in turn were inspired by the civil uprising in Tunisia that led to the broader ‘Arab Spring’ protest movements. Muammar Gaddafi responded with repression which generated condemnation from the international community. A firm speech by Gaddafi coupled with increased violence against protesters on February 22 generated a crisis for the United States and others. A series of UN Resolutions, with support from the Arab League, led to the establishment of a no-fly zone over Syria largely enforced by NATO countries. A civil war on the ground between various Libyan factions led to the defeat of Gaddafi’s regime and Gaddafi’s death.

North Korea Nuclear V (2013)

Crisis Number: 469

Triggering Entity: North Korea

Opponents: North Korea

Region: Central, South, and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no U.S. foreign nuclear deployments in the region; the United States had withdrawn its FND from South Korea in 1991. Second, the crisis was not the result of new fears of FND introduction. Rather, it was the result of ongoing tensions over the North Korean nuclear program. The immediate trigger was a North Korean nuclear weapon test on February 12, 2013. A series of military maneuvers by the United States, South Korea, and North Korea, new UN sanctions, and North Korean belligerent rhetoric followed. The crisis subsided in August when North Korea entered negotiations with South Korea, effectively returning relations to the pre-crisis status quo, though the larger nuclear issue was unresolved.

Syria Chemical Weapons (2013)

Crisis Number: 470

Triggering Entity:

Opponents: Syria

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United States did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Turkey). However, there was no change in their status in 2013 that might have led to a crisis after years of Libya not acting in response to the American FND. Rather, the crisis was the result of intensifying civil war in Syria. The specific trigger was the video revelation on August 21 confirming that the Syrian government had utilized chemical weapons against civilians near Damascus. The attack was large scale and unambiguous relative to earlier allegations of Syrian government chemical weapon use. This triggered a crisis for the United States, in large part because President Barack Obama had explicitly set chemical weapon usage as a ‘red-line’ that would “change his calculus about US involvement” during a August 2012 speech. There was significant domestic opposition to military strikes against the Bashar al-Assad regime. Russia provided a solution in which the U.S. would not strike in exchange for Syrian agreement “to dismantle its chemical weapons and place them under international control.” Syrian compliance with the proposal ended the crisis.

II. Soviet Union

Azerbaijan (1946)

Crisis Number: 108

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: United States, United Kingdom, Iran

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were as of yet no Soviet FNDs. Second, the Soviet Union did not even have a nuclear weapon at this point so it is highly unlikely that the possibility of impending Soviet FNDs entered American, British, or Iranian minds. Thus the crisis was not due to anticipated Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of Soviet involvement and troops in Iran after the end of World War II. During World War II Allied forces, including most importantly British and Soviet forces, had entered parts of Iran to secure supply lines and deter any outside encroachments. An initial crisis occurred for Iran in late 1945 when the Tudeh Party attempted to take control of Tabriz, a city in northern Iran near the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and headquarters for Soviet forces in Iran. Soviet troops prevented Iranian government forces from entering the region to reassert Tehran's control. The main part of the crisis involving the United States began in March 1946 following the Soviet failure to withdraw its troops from Iran per agreement. Iran appealed to the United States and United Kingdom. The United States exerted significant diplomatic pressure and the issue came before the newly formed United Nations Security Council. Faced with growing opposition the Soviet Union announced that Soviet troops would be withdrawn within six weeks of March 24. The final Soviet forces withdrew on May 9, 1946. Note that the start date in the Dyadic Data is 1946, the start of the crisis between the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union; the start date in the data viewer is August 1945 which was the start of the crisis for Iran.

Turkish Straits (1946)

Crisis Number: 111

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: United States, Turkey

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were as of yet no Soviet FNDs. Second, the Soviet Union did not even have a nuclear weapon at this point so it is highly unlikely that the possibility of impending Soviet FNDs entered American, British, or Iranian minds. Thus the crisis was not due to anticipated Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis resulted from Soviet pressure on Turkey and Turkish appeals for American support. The Soviet Union, and Russia before it, had long sought unfettered access to the Mediterranean Sea. Accordingly, in August 1946 the Soviet Union issued a demand to revise the Montreaux Convention providing Turkey control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. At the same time Turkey and the United States believed that the Soviet Union was moving military forces into nearby areas. The United States elected to back Turkey and dispatched various military forces, including the newest aircraft carrier the *U.S.S. Franklin D. Roosevelt* to the Mediterranean Sea to show support for Turkey. Faced with strong opposition the Soviet Union backed down.

Communism in Hungary (1947)

Crisis Number: 113

Triggering Entity: Hungary

Opponents: Hungary

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were as of yet no Soviet FNDs. Second, the Soviet Union did not even have a nuclear weapon at this point so it is highly unlikely that the possibility of impending Soviet FNDs entered Hungarian leaders' minds. Thus the crisis was not due to anticipated Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of internal Hungarian politics and Soviet concern to maintain influence in the country. The initial cause of the crisis was the call for the withdrawal of occupation forces from Hungary. The Soviet Union believed this to be a threat to their influence.

Soviet officials alongside Hungarian communists purged several political officials, ultimately forcing Hungarian Prime Minister Nagy to resign. When he did so the crisis largely ended with “Hungarian political resistance ... broken.”

Marshall Plan (1947)

Crisis Number: 115

Triggering Entity: United States

Opponents: Czechoslovakia

Region: United States

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were as of yet no Soviet FNDs. Second, the Soviet Union did not even have a nuclear weapon at this point so it is highly unlikely that the possibility of impending Soviet FNDs entered Czechoslovakian leaders' minds. Thus the crisis was not due to anticipated Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of Soviet efforts to maintain their dominance in Eastern Europe. The American offer of large scale aid to Europe initially generated widespread interest in Eastern Europe and curiosity in Moscow. Soviet leaders quickly came to oppose the American program, however, unwilling to make the necessary concessions for support and viewing the broader program as a challenge to their influence in Eastern Europe. Soviet leaders were also alarmed at the prospect of revitalizing Germany.⁶⁹ The specific Soviet-Czechoslovakian crisis that the ICB codes was the result of the Soviet ultimatum to Czechoslovakia on July 8 to not attend any further meetings regarding the Marshall Plan despite Czechoslovakia's earlier acceptance of an invitation for additional talks. Czechoslovakia's government, aware of its precarious position surrounded by Soviet troops and within what even the United States' considered the Soviet zone of influence, gave in to the Soviet demands.

Communism in Czechoslovakia (1948)

Crisis Number: 121

Triggering Entity: Czechoslovakia

Opponents: Czechoslovakia

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were as of yet no Soviet FNDs. Second, the Soviet Union did not even have a nuclear weapon at this point so it is highly unlikely that the possibility of impending Soviet FNDs entered Czechoslovakian leaders' minds. Thus the crisis was not due to anticipated Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of internal political turmoil in Czechoslovakia and the threat this posed to Soviet influence in the country. The decision to transfer or retire all non-communist police regional commanders in Prague in February led to 12 non-communist members of Czechoslovakia's cabinet resigning in protest. The Soviets feared adverse implications for the Communist Party, and pushed President Edvard Benes to allow the resignations and effectively hand power to the Communist Party. Thereafter the Communist Party firmly controlled Czechoslovakia.

Soviet Note to Finland, I* (1948)

Crisis Number: 122

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

⁶⁹ On these points see also Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*; Marc Trachtenberg, “The Marshall Plan as Tragedy,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter 2005), 135-140; and John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), chaps. 2-3.

Opponents: Finland

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were as of yet no Soviet FNDs. Second, the Soviet Union did not even have a nuclear weapon at this point so it is highly unlikely that the possibility of impending Soviet FNDs entered Finnish leaders' minds. Rather, the crisis was the result of Soviet opposition to Nordic cooperation backed by the United States. The Soviets requested Finland sign a Treaty of Mutual Friendship, Cooperation, and Non-Aggression with the Soviet Union, which would "effectively prevent Finland from adopting a pro-Western stance" or pursuing a truly independent foreign policy. Finland accepted the invitation and negotiations proceeded smoothly.

Berlin Blockade (1948)

Crisis Number: 123

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: United States, United Kingdom, France

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were as of yet no Soviet FNDs. Second, the Soviet Union did not even have a nuclear weapon at this point so it is highly unlikely that the possibility of impending Soviet FNDs entered Western leaders' minds. Rather, the crisis resulted from the Soviet decision to blockade the land and river routes to Western occupation zones in Berlin. The immediate trigger for the Soviet decision was the Western – British, French, and American – decision to introduce a new currency into their occupation zones outside the four power framework. The deeper issue for Soviet leaders was the movement this represented to an independent West German state that could imperil Soviet policy in Germany broadly, including its occupation zone in what would become East Germany, and with it the broader Soviet security buffer zone in Eastern Europe. The United States elected to remain in the city and resupply it via the air. Soviet hopes that the airlift would fail did not come to pass and, unwilling to escalate to war, the Soviet Union eventually backed down and allowed Western ground access into Berlin.⁷⁰

Soviet Bloc-Yugoslavia* (1949)

Crisis Number: 131

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: Yugoslavia

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were as of yet no Soviet FNDs. Second, at the start of the crisis the Soviet Union did not even have a nuclear weapon, so it is highly unlikely that the possibility of impending Soviet FNDs entered Yugoslavian leaders' minds. Rather, the crisis was the result of building intra-Communist bloc tensions between Moscow and the only Communist regime in Eastern Europe to attain power after World War II without significant Soviet support. The Soviet Union had expelled Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau and the United States began extending overtures to Yugoslavia. The August 1949 crisis occurred when the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum coupled with military maneuvers. Yugoslavia responded by placing its own forces on alert. The ICB notes that "The crisis gradually faded."

⁷⁰ On Soviet motivations see also Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

Korean War (1950)

Crisis Number: 133

Triggering Entity: North Korea⁷¹

Opponents: United States

Region: Central, South, and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were as of yet no Soviet FNDs. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis, in reality a war, began with North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. Korea had been occupied by Japan from 1910 to 1945. Following World War II the United States and Soviet Union effectively divided Korea into two separate zones at the 38th parallel. Each side installed its preferred regime. In North Korea Kim Il-sung, with Soviet backing, consolidated power. Kim consistently sought Soviet support to conquer the southern zone by force. It was not until 1950 that Stalin relented and the North Korean attack commenced. U.S. leaders quickly viewed the invasion as part of a broader Soviet expansionist campaign and decided to intervene. A series of UN resolutions on June 25, 27, and July 7 authorized military force to evict North Korean forces. After initial setbacks UN forces, primarily American and South Korea, conducted an amphibious assault at Inchon and quickly routed North Korean military forces. U.S. leadership then elected to 'rollback' communism in the area by destroying the North Korean regime and unifying Korea. South Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel on September 30 with American forces following on October 7. The People's Republic of China viewed this as a major threat and feared that if the United States eliminated North Korea it would pose an intolerable threat to the young PRC regime. Chinese forces began crossing the Yalu River separating China from North Korea in late October and briefly clashed with UN forces. Major Chinese assaults against US forces followed in late November, surprising the Americans and leading to the retreat of U.S. forces. The war settled into a bitter three year struggle before ending in stalemate on July 27, 1953. Following President Dwight Eisenhower's election, U.S. officials conveyed to China the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons. This would likely have involved aircraft operating from Guam or Okinawa. Had weapons been transferred to South Korea it would likely have been for immediate use by aircraft rather than sustained deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea or non-U.S. territory.⁷² The threat therefore does not constitute a potential or actual FND. Note that the ICB data codes three separate crises for the Korean War: the initial North Korean attack (132) and response; the U.S. decision to counter-invade North Korea and Chinese response (133); renewed Chinese assaults and American nuclear threats (140). I group all three crises together in this discussion as they are part of a single war and for simplicity of discussion.

⁷¹ Note that the ICB codes the specific crisis 133 being triggered by South Korea. As noted, I group the various Korean War crises – 132, 133, 140 – together.

⁷² In addition to the ICB summary, see Shen Zhihua, *Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1960s*, Neil Silver, trans. (New York: Routledge, 2012); Telegram to Stalin Concerning the Decision to Send Troops into Korea for Combat, October 2, 1950, in Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," *International Security* Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), 151; "Ciphred Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin)," October 13, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, listy 1-2. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113743>; Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 320; Chen Jian, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 1* (June 1992), 25-34; John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 78-82; Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 87; Andrew Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 86, 89-90, 92-93; Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, *After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 48-49; Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988-1989), 50-91.

Catalina Affair (1952)

Crisis Number: 137

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: Sweden

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were as of yet no Soviet FNDs. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of the Soviet military shooting down two Swedish DC-3 'Catalina' aircraft. At the time the Soviet Union denied shooting the first aircraft, and only later did Sweden acknowledge that the first aircraft had been spying on the Soviet Union.⁷³ At the time Sweden put its army on alert. The crisis faded as both sides essentially let the matter drop.

Suez Nationalization War (1956)

Crisis Number: 152

Triggering Entity: Egypt

Opponents: France, Israel, United Kingdom, United States

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments:

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, the Soviet Union did not have any FND at this point. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending Soviet FND deployments. Rather, the crisis was the result of the Egyptian decision to nationalize the Suez Canal and subsequent British-French-Israeli collusion to launch a war to retake the Canal. Israel invaded the Sinai on October 29. Britain and France then intervened on October 31, allegedly to separate the two sides from fighting but with the ulterior motive of overturning Egyptian control of the Canal. Egyptian Leader Nasser appealed to the Soviet Union and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev issued harsh statements, including what many perceived as nuclear threats, to the Western Powers. Khrushchev later claimed that his threats helped compel British and French withdrawal. In reality, the United States exerted strong pressure on Britain and France to withdraw. President Dwight Eisenhower was furious that the operation had taken place without consultation with the United States and against expressed American desires.

Poland Liberalization (1956)

Crisis Number: 154

Triggering Entity: Poland

Opponents: Poland

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, the Soviet Union did not have any FND at this point. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending Soviet FND deployments. Rather, the crisis was the result of internal political developments in Poland and the fear this generated in Moscow for the latter's dominance in Eastern Europe. Specifically, a crisis occurred for the Soviet Union when Wladyslaw Gomulka returned to power after having been previously purged for Titoism. Soviet leaders traveled to Warsaw and put troops on alert. The Polish leadership prevented anti-Soviet demonstrations and its behavior remained acceptable to Moscow.

⁷³ See also Stefan Lovgren, "Cold War Spy Plane Found in Baltic Sea," National Geographic News, October 10, 2013.

Hungarian Uprising (1956)

Crisis Number: 155

Triggering Entity: Non-state actor

Opponents: Hungary

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, the Soviet Union did not have any FND at this point. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of internal domestic political developments in Hungary and the fear this generated in Moscow for the latter's dominance in Eastern Europe. Specifically, a crisis occurred for the Soviet Union in the wake of massive demonstrations across Hungary that called for the "withdrawal of Soviet troops, the return of Imre Nagy to power, progress toward democratization, and the development of Soviet-Hungarian relations of the basis of absolute equality." Soviet troops quickly entered Hungary leading to Hungary announcing its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union continued its invasion, removed Nagy from power (who was later shot), and installed a pliant regime.

Berlin Deadline (1958)

Crisis Number: 168

Opponents: United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: Yes – though not to Soviet FND.

Discussion: See discussion in article.

Berlin Wall (1961)

Crisis Number: 185

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor (Soviet Union)

Opponents: United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: Yes – though not to Soviet FND.

Discussion: See discussion in article.

Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

Crisis Number: 196

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: United States

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: Yes

Discussion: See discussion in article.

Congo II (1964)

Crisis Number: 211

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: United States, Belgium

Region: Sub-Saharan Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were no Soviet foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of ongoing political instability with the Congo with the United States and Soviet Union backing opposing sides.

Six Day War (1967)

Crisis Number: 222

Triggering Entity: Egypt

Opponents: United States

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were no Soviet foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis for the United States and Soviet Union was the result of Soviet threats to intervene in the Six Day War to block further Israeli military advances following initial Israeli successes.

Prague Spring (1968)

Crisis Number: 227

Triggering Entity: Czechoslovakia

Opponents: Czechoslovakia

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The Soviet Union did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (East Germany, Hungary, and Poland). The crisis was the result of political instability in Czechoslovakia that threatened Communist control of other Warsaw Pact states and, for the Soviet Union, the solidarity the Warsaw Pact as well as perhaps inspiring Ukrainian nationalist sentiment. The Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union, subsequently invaded Czechoslovakia in August and stifled the “counterrevolutionary” elements.

Ussuri River (1969)

Crisis Number: 231

Triggering Entity: China

Opponents: China

Region: Central and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The Soviet Union did have nuclear weapons in the region (Mongolia). The crisis was the result of ongoing ideological animosity between China and the Soviet Union as well as ongoing border disputes. These disputes predated the Soviet foreign nuclear deployment in the region. The ICB summary concludes: “A foreign policy crisis for the USSR, as distinct from an incident, was initiated by a Chinese ambush of Soviet troops on 2 March 1969. Moscow's response, which triggered a crisis for China, was a massive attack on 15 March against Chinese forces stationed along the Ussuri River. China responded militarily the day of the attack. There were considerable casualties on both sides. Tension continued along the border, but there were no further military hostilities.” In addition, as noted in the article, the Soviet Union already had nuclear weapons inside Soviet territory closer to China at the time of the deployment.

War of Attrition (1969)

Crisis Number: 232

Triggering Entity: Egypt

Opponents: Israel

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were no Soviet foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis was part of the ongoing Egyptian-Israeli dispute over the Sinai Peninsula following the Israeli conquest in the 1967 Six Day War. The Soviet Union backed Egypt in the dispute. The Soviet Union increased support in response to increasingly damaging Israeli air strikes against Egypt, culminating in direct confrontation between Israeli and Soviet aircraft in April.

Cienfuegos Submarine Base (1970)

Crisis Number: 239

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: United States

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: In September 1970 a brief, minor crisis flared over the construction of a Soviet naval facility in Cuba that could have hosted Soviet nuclear missile submarines.⁷⁴ Soviet naval forces capable of delivering nuclear weapons occasionally visited Cuba after 1962. The discovery in late 1970 that the Soviets were building a naval base at Cienfuegos that might house Soviet naval forces armed with nuclear weapons caused some alarm in Washington.⁷⁵ The deployment never occurred, though the Soviets occasionally probed the American position thereafter. Because the possible deployment centered on naval forces, specifically Soviet submarines, it does not meet the coding criteria for a foreign nuclear deployment (FND) and thus I did not include a discussion in the main article.

However, to the extent there was a crisis related to nuclear weapons it generally conforms to the features of my argument. Specifically, the deployment was in an area of vital interest to the United States and it did threaten to violate past agreements. American concern centered on these past agreements explicitly. At a NSC meeting on September 23, 1970 Nixon noted that “in his view, the new base would constitute a marginal strategic advantage.”⁷⁶ However, the Soviets had stated in August that they were adhering to the 1962 agreement regarding Cuba.⁷⁷ The issue at stake, Henry Kissinger argued, was why had the Soviets gone “directly against the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1962 understandings?”⁷⁸

The administration worked to avoid any sort of crisis atmosphere. Privately, it made clear to the Soviets that their actions were unacceptable. Nixon instructed that if the Soviets ignored these overtures then it was necessary to “consider the possibility of a new blockade [of Cuba] with surface ships and the possibility of mining the entrance to the harbor.”⁷⁹ There was hope it would not come to that, but if it did

⁷⁴ For general discussion of the crisis see Raymond L. Garthoff, “Handling the Cienfuegos Crisis,” *International Security* Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), 46-66

⁷⁵ Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, September 22, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. 2, 636-643.

⁷⁶ Minutes of the National Security Council, September 23, 1970 *FRUS 1969-1976* Vol. 12, 652. See also Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, September 22, 1970, *ibid*, 638; and Kissinger’s notes in Editorial Note, *ibid*, Vol. 13, 184.

⁷⁷ Kissinger Conversation with Vorontsov, August 4, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. 12, 588.

⁷⁸ Minutes of the NSC, September 23, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976* Vol. 12, 651.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 652-653.

the situation favored the United States. As Nixon remarked near the end of the meeting, “even though the strategic balance has changed drastically since 1962 the Soviets would never trade Russia for Havana.”⁸⁰

The issue was ultimately settled with little fuss. Kissinger raised the American concern with Dobrynin privately on September 25. On October 6 Dobrynin replied that the Soviets would do nothing in Cuba which would contradict the 1962 understanding. The Soviet Ambassador added that while submarines might occasionally visit Cuba they “would not call there in an operational capacity.”⁸¹ As Kissinger later pointed out, the Soviets had actually gone beyond the 1962 understanding, “which referred to offensive missiles and extended it to submarine bases.”⁸² When Nixon met with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the end of October the Cuban issue was essentially ignored.⁸³

Cod War I (1973)*

Crisis Number: 254

Triggering Entity: Iceland

Opponents: United Kingdom

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The Soviet Union did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis. The dispute centered on Icelandic harassment of fishing grounds beyond the standard twelve miles from its shore. The main targets were British and West German ships. The ICB summary concludes: “USSR involvement was more substantial, however. Continued NATO use of the Keflavik air base, which was necessary for the implementation of important NATO antisubmarine warfare operations, was already an issue in Icelandic politics. Iceland’s request to the USSR for a show of force during the crisis was answered by a special Soviet naval exercise: 10 Russian ships and 10 submarines were dispatched as a signal to the U.K.”

October War (1973)

Crisis Number: 255

Triggering Entity: Multi-state

Opponents: United States, Israel

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were no Soviet foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending Soviet FNDs. Rather, the war was the result of ongoing Egyptian and Syrian inability to reacquire territory lost in the 1967 Six Day War. The Soviet Union backed Egypt and Syria and supplied each with military equipment. Egyptian and Syrian refusal of a cease-fire in place on October 12 led to greater U.S. involvement. Following Israeli violations of a cease-fire agreement on October 22 and the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army the Soviet Union sent a note to the United States outlining the possibility of Soviet intervention which led to a modest U.S. increase in its nuclear alert status.

⁸⁰ Ibid, 653.

⁸¹ Memorandum of Conversation, October 6, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. 12, 670. See also Memorandum of Conversation, September 25, 1970, *ibid*, 663-664; Memorandum of Conversation, October 9, 1970, *ibid*, 681-685; Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, October 14, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976* Vol. 13, 23-28.

⁸² Editorial Note, 182-183, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. 13, 182-183.

⁸³ Memorandum of Conversation, October 22, 1970, *FRUS 1969-1976*, Vol. 13, 86-101; Memorandum of Conversation, October 23, 1970, *ibid*, 119.

War in Angola (1975)

Crisis Number: 260

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: United States, Zaire, Zambia, South Africa

Region: Sub-Saharan Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were no Soviet foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of the breakdown in the Alvor Agreement which granted independence to Angola. Fighting began between U.S. backed anti-communist forces and Soviet and Cuban backed pro-communist forces. The ICB summary concludes: "There was intense foreign involvement in the Angolan War. Cuba, the Soviet Union, Congo (Brazzaville), and Yugoslavia actively supported the MPLA, with Cuban forces directly engaged in combat. The United States, China, North Korea, and Zaire aided the FNLA; Zaire, in addition to extensive diplomatic activity, provided military bases on its territory."

Ogaden II* 1978

Crisis Number: 282

Triggering Entity: Non-state actor

Opponents: Somalia

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, there were no Soviet foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of ongoing hostilities between Somalia and Ethiopia. In 1974 a coup brought a Marxist group to power in Ethiopia. In 1978 anti-communist forces backed by Somalia in Ethiopia and Somali troops succeeded in capturing 90% of the Ogaden territory. The Soviet Union responded by pouring in military supplies, advisors, and transporting Cuban troops into the area. With this support Ethiopian forces routed the Somalis and recaptured the lost territory.

Afghanistan Invasion (1979)

Crisis Number: 303

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: United States, Pakistan

Region: Central, South, and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The Soviet Union did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Mongolia) but they played no role in the crisis. The crisis for the United States occurred following the Soviet decision to intervene with large numbers of ground troops in December 1979 (the initial operations began on December 25). The American response was not driven by concerns about Soviet FNDs. For discussion of the Soviet decision-making in the crisis see the discussion in the section on the United States, above.

Soviet Threat Pakistan* (1979)

Crisis Number: 306

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: Pakistan

Region: Central, South, and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The Soviet Union did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Mongolia) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis. Rather, the crisis was the result of ongoing tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the Pakistani fear, fed by a Soviet statement on June 1, that the Soviet Union would back Afghanistan in a future Afghan-Pakistani conflict or possibly even intervene directly to prevent Afghan rebels from seeking sanctuary or support in Pakistan.

Poland Liberalization (1980)

Crisis Number: 315

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor

Opponents: Poland

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The Soviet Union did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland). The crisis was the result of ongoing internal political instability within Poland and Soviet concern for its hegemony within the Warsaw Pact. As the ICB summary concludes: On 14 August 1980, 17,000 Polish workers at the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk went on strike and occupied the huge industrial complex. They also presented a series of demands, some of which were perceived as political in nature by the Communist leaders of Poland. These events triggered a crisis for Poland and the USSR.”

U-137 Incident (1981)

Crisis Number: 333

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: Sweden

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The Soviet Union did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland). The crisis was the result of a Soviet submarine wedged in Swedish territorial waters. As the ICB summary concludes: “A Swedish ad hoc crisis decision-making group, ... decided the following on the 28th: to turn down a request for the entry of Soviet rescue ships; to prevent any contact between Soviet embassy personnel in Stockholm and the crew of the submarine; and to have the national research defense agency inspect the submarine, for nuclear material was suspected. That cluster of decisions triggered a crisis for the USSR. Moscow perceived a multifaceted threat: to its superpower image; to its influence among nonaligned states; to its relations with Sweden; and to its image for probity regarding nuclear material.”

Able Archer (1983)*

Crisis Number: 344

Triggering Entity: United States

Opponents: United States

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: Borderline – though not linked to Soviet FND.

Discussion: See discussion in article.

Nicaragua MIG-21S (1984)*

Crisis Number: 354

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: United States

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Soviet FND. First, the Soviet Union did not have any FND at this point. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending Soviet FNDs. Rather, the crisis began when reports surfaced that a Soviet cargo ship was “en route to Nicaragua carrying MIG-21s for the Sandinista regime.” The United States intensified military exercises and U.S. naval patrols.

Iraq No Fly Zone (1992)

Crisis Number: 406

Triggering Entity: Multi-state

Opponents: Iraq

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Russian FND. First, Russia did not have any FNDs in the region during 1992 using both the standard and relaxed coding schemes. Russia removed FNDs from Mongolia in 1992. Using relaxed coding results in Russian FNDs in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

However, Russia was in the process of negotiating withdrawals for each weapon. Moreover, the crisis was not related to Russian FNDs. Rather, the crisis was the result of ongoing U.S.-Iraqi tensions following the Gulf War. In response to central government repression of Iraq’s Shiites in the south of Iraq an international coalition created a no-fly zone, similar to what existed in the north to safeguard Iraq’s Kurds. The announcement and dispatch of aircraft triggered a crisis for Iraq, “which perceived a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Georgia / Abkhazia (1992)*

Crisis Number: 407

Triggering Entity: Russia

Opponents: Georgia

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to Russian FND. First, Russia did not have any FNDs in the region using the standard coding. Russia withdrew FNDs from Mongolia in 1992. Using relaxed coding results in Russian FNDs in the region in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. However, Russia was in the process of negotiating withdrawals for those weapons. The crisis appears to be independent of any nuclear concerns. The crisis was the result of political instability in Georgia with Abkhazian separatists following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The ICB summary concludes: “On 25 September 1992 Russia's Supreme Soviet (later, Duma) denounced Georgia's resort to violence in the interethnic conflict with the separatists of Abkhazia. It also passed a resolution suspending the delivery of Russian arms and equipment to Georgia. This triggered a crisis for Georgia, reinforcing its image of Russia as the patron of the Abkhaz separatists. Georgia accused Russia of interference in its domestic affairs.”

III. United Kingdom

Azerbaijan (1946)

Crisis Number: 108

Triggering Entity: Non-state actor

Opponents: Soviet Union

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relation to foreign-deployed nuclear weapons for two reasons. First, the British had no FNDs in the region. Second, the British did not have nuclear weapons at this point making it unlikely that any actor feared an impending British FND. Rather, the crisis was the result of Soviet involvement and troops in Iran after the end of World War II. During World War II Allied forces, including most importantly British and Soviet forces, had entered parts of Iran to secure supply lines and deter any outside encroachments. An initial crisis occurred for Iran in late 1945 when the Tudeh Party attempted to take control of Tabriz, a city in northern Iran near the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and headquarters for Soviet forces in Iran. Soviet troops prevented Iranian government forces from entering the region to reassert Tehran's control. The main part of the crisis involving the United States began in March 1946 following the Soviet failure to withdraw its troops from Iran per agreement. Iran appealed to the United States and United Kingdom. The United States exerted significant diplomatic pressure and the issue came before the newly formed United Nations Security Council. Faced with growing opposition the Soviet Union announced that Soviet troops would be withdrawn within six weeks of March 24. The final Soviet forces withdrew on May 9, 1946. Note that the start date in the Dyadic Data is 1946, the start of the crisis between the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union; the start date in the data viewer is August 1945 which was the start of the crisis for Iran.

Berlin Blockade (1948)

Crisis Number: 123

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: Soviet Union

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relation to foreign-deployed nuclear weapons for two reasons. First, the British had no FNDs in the region. Second, the British did not have nuclear weapons at this point making it unlikely that any actor feared an impending British FND. Rather, the crisis resulted from the Soviet decision to blockade the land and river routes to Western occupation zones in Berlin. The immediate trigger for the Soviet decision was the Western – British, French, and American – decision to introduce a new currency into their occupation zones outside the four power framework. The deeper issue for Soviet leaders was the movement this represented to an independent West German state that could imperil Soviet policy in Germany broadly, including its occupation zone in what would become East Germany, and with it the broader Soviet security buffer zone in Eastern Europe. The United States elected to remain in the city and resupply it via the air. Soviet hopes that the airlift would fail did not come to pass and, unwilling to escalate to war, the Soviet Union eventually backed down and allowed Western ground access into Berlin.⁸⁴

Sinai Incursion (1948)

Crisis Number: 128

Triggering Entity: Israel

Opponents: Israel

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments:

Discussion: There was no relation to foreign-deployed nuclear weapons for two reasons. First, the British had no FNDs in the region. Second, the British did not have nuclear weapons at this point making it

⁸⁴ On Soviet motivations see also Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

unlikely that any actor feared an impending British FND. Rather, the crisis was the result of Israel's crossing into Egyptian territory during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Egypt appealed to Britain for aid. Britain responded with an ultimatum demanding Israel abandon Egyptian territory. Israel remained in the Sinai and shot down five British aircraft observing Israeli forces in the area. Britain sent additional reinforcements to the area and Israel withdrew from the Suez.

Korean War (1950)

Crisis Number: 132, 133, 140

Triggering Entity: North Korea

Opponents: China, North Korea

Region: Central, South, and East Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relation to foreign-deployed nuclear weapons for two reasons. First, the British had no FNDs in the region. Second, the British did not have nuclear weapons at this point making it unlikely that any actor feared an impending British FND. Rather, the crisis, in reality a war, began with North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. Korea had been occupied by Japan from 1910 to 1945. Following World War II the United States and Soviet Union effectively divided Korea into two separate zones at the 38th parallel. Each side installed its preferred regime. In North Korea Kim Il-sung, with Soviet backing, consolidated power. Kim consistently sought Soviet support to conquer the southern zone by force. It was not until 1950 that Stalin relented and the North Korean attack commenced. U.S. leaders quickly viewed the invasion as part of a broader Soviet expansionist campaign and decided to intervene. A series of UN resolutions on June 25, 27, and July 7 authorized military force to evict North Korean forces. After initial setbacks UN forces, primarily American and South Korea, conducted an amphibious assault at Inchon and quickly routed North Korean military forces. U.S. leadership then elected to 'rollback' communism in the area by destroying the North Korean regime and unifying Korea. South Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel on September 30 with American forces following on October 7. The People's Republic of China viewed this as a major threat and feared that if the United States eliminated North Korea it would pose an intolerable threat to the young PRC regime. Chinese forces began crossing the Yalu River separating China from North Korea in late October and briefly clashed with UN forces. Major Chinese assaults against US forces followed in late November, surprising the Americans and leading to the retreat of U.S. forces. The war settled into a bitter three year struggle before ending in stalemate on July 27, 1953. Following President Dwight Eisenhower's election, U.S. officials conveyed to China the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons. This would likely have involved aircraft operating from Guam or Okinawa. Had weapons been transferred to South Korea it would likely have been for immediate use by aircraft rather than sustained deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea or non-U.S. territory.⁸⁵ The threat therefore does not constitute a potential or actual FND. Note that

⁸⁵ In addition to the ICB summary, see Shen Zhihua, *Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1960s*, Neil Silver, trans. (New York: Routledge, 2012); Telegram to Stalin Concerning the Decision to Send Troops into Korea for Combat, October 2, 1950, in Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," *International Security* Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), 151; "Ciphred Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin)," October 13, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 335, listy 1-2.

<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113743>; Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 320; Chen Jian, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 1* (June 1992), 25-34; John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 78-82; Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 87; Andrew Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 86, 89-90, 92-93; Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, *After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War*,

the ICB data codes three separate crises for the Korean War: the initial North Korean attack (132) and response; the U.S. decision to counter-invade North Korea and Chinese response (133); renewed Chinese assaults and American nuclear threats (140). I group all three crises together in this discussion as they are part of a single war and for simplicity of discussion.

Suez Canal (1951)

Crisis Number: 136

Triggering Entity: United Kingdom

Opponents: Egypt

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments:

Discussion: There was no relation to foreign-deployed nuclear weapons for two reasons. First, the British had no FNDs in the region. Second, the British did not have nuclear weapons at this point making it unlikely that any actor feared an impending British FND. Rather, the crisis was the result of Egyptian efforts to assert its control of the Suez Canal. On July 30 the United Kingdom reaffirmed its right to the Canal. On October 8 the Egyptian parliament considered a proposal abrogating the treaty and demanding British withdrawal from the Canal Zone. The British reinforced the area and Egyptian efforts to spur popular resistance led to “prolonged and serious clashes.” In January 1950 the two sides agreed to renew talks.

Trieste II (1953)

Crisis Number 142

Triggering Entity: Multi-state

Opponents: Yugoslavia

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relation to foreign-deployed nuclear weapons for two reasons. First, the British had no FNDs in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending British FND. Rather, the crisis resulted from the U.S. and British announcement that they would terminate military governance in Trieste, withdraw troops, and “relinquish the administration to the Italian government.” The status of Trieste had long been contested between Italy and Yugoslavia and the possibility of Italian control triggered a crisis for Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia closed the border and called up military reserves. Italy responded by placing three divisions near the border. A December 1953 agreement for the withdrawal of Italian and Yugoslav forces from the border “ended the crisis for both actors.” In 1975 the Treaty of Osimo divided Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia.

1956 Suez Nationalization War (1956)

Crisis Number: 152

Triggering Entity: Egypt

Opponents: Egypt, Soviet Union

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relation to foreign-deployed nuclear weapons for two reasons. First, the British had no FNDs in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending British FND. Rather, the crisis was the result of the Egyptian decision to nationalize the Suez Canal and subsequent British-French-Israeli collusion to launch a war to retake the Canal. Israel invaded the Sinai on October 29.

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 48-49; Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988-1989), 50-91.

Britain and France then intervened on October 31, allegedly to separate the two sides from fighting but with the ulterior motive of overturning Egyptian control of the Canal. Egyptian Leader Nasser appealed to the Soviet Union and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev issued harsh statements, including what many perceived as nuclear threats, to the Western Powers. Khrushchev later claimed that his threats helped compel British and French withdrawal. In reality, the United States exerted strong pressure on Britain and France to withdraw. President Dwight Eisenhower was furious that the operation had taken place without consultation with the United States and against expressed American desires.

Berlin Deadline (1958)

Crisis Number: 168

Triggering Entity: Soviet Union

Opponents: Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: Yes – though not to UK FND.

Discussion: See discussion in article.

Kuwait Independence (1961)

Crisis Number: 183

Triggering Entity: United Kingdom

Opponents: Iraq

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments for two reasons. First, there were no United Kingdom foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending British FND. Rather, the crisis was the result of the British granting of independence for Kuwait in 1961 along with a mutual defense treaty. Iraq viewed Kuwait as a part of Iraq. Iraq threatened violence against Kuwait which led to the dispatch of British troops to Kuwait.

Berlin Wall (1961)

Crisis Number: 185

Triggering Entity: Non-State Actor (Soviet Union)

Opponents: Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: Yes – though not to UK FND.

Discussion: See discussion in article. The British foreign-deployed nuclear weapons were not instrumental in this crisis. American foreign-deployed nuclear weapons contributed.

Malaysian Federation (1963)*

Crisis Number: 197

Triggering Entity: Indonesia

Opponents: Indonesia

Region: Southeast Asia

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The British did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (Malaysia). The crisis was the result of contesting claims and political instability following the end of British control of its Southeast Asian colonies. The ICB summary concludes: “The trigger to Malaya's crisis was President

Sukarno's declaration on 11 February 1963 that Indonesia strongly opposed a Malaysia federation. Malaya responded two days later by announcing an immediate expansion of its armed forces. Talks between the U.K. and the five participating entities resulted in an agreement in London on 9 July 1963 for the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, which was signed by all except Brunei. This triggered a crisis for Indonesia.”

Cod War I (1973)*

Crisis Number: 254

Triggering Entity: Iceland

Opponents: Iceland, Soviet Union

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United Kingdom did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (West Germany) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis. The dispute centered on Icelandic harassment of fishing grounds beyond the standard twelve miles from its shore. The main targets were British and West German ships. The ICB summary concludes: “USSR involvement was more substantial, however. Continued NATO use of the Keflavik air base, which was necessary for the implementation of important NATO antisubmarine warfare operations, was already an issue in Icelandic politics. Iceland's request to the USSR for a show of force during the crisis was answered by a special Soviet naval exercise: 10 Russian ships and 10 submarines were dispatched as a signal to the U.K.”

Belize I (1975)*

Crisis Number: 262

Triggering Entity: Guatemala

Opponents: Guatemala

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no United Kingdom foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending British FND. Rather, the crisis was the result of ongoing disputes about the status of Belize. Guatemala claimed the territory of Belize following World War II before the United Kingdom even had nuclear weapons. The ICB summary concludes: “On 1 November 1975 the U.K. perceived a likely invasion of Belize following increased Guatemalan military activity--a movement of troops and patrol boats near the Belize border. The U.K. responded on 5 November with the dispatch of additional forces to strengthen the British garrison in Belize. A declaration by Guatemala that it intended to annex Belize was reported on the 7th.”

Cod War II (1975)

Crisis Number: 263

Triggering Entity: Iceland

Opponents: Iceland

Region: Europe

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: The United Kingdom did have foreign-deployed nuclear weapons in the region (West Germany) but they were distant making it unlikely they were a cause of the crisis. The dispute was part of an ongoing dispute between Iceland and Britain over the ownership status of fishing grounds beyond 12 miles from Iceland's shore (see Crisis Number 254, above). The United Kingdom dispatched naval

vessels in 1975 and subsequent talks generated no progress. There were minor clashes between British and Icelandic vessels.

Belize II (1977)*

Crisis Number: 279

Triggering Entity: Guatemala

Opponents: Guatemala

Region: North America and Caribbean

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no United Kingdom foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending British FND. Rather, the crisis was the result of ongoing disputes about the status of Belize (see crisis number 262 above). The ICB summary concludes: "On 25 June 1977 Guatemalan troops were deployed to the Belize border area, and reservists were called up. This action triggered a crisis for the U.K., which was responsible for Belize's security. It was followed by a statement from President Garcia on 1 July affirming Guatemala's rights to the territory. The U.K. responded on 6 July by dispatching air, infantry, and naval forces to the area."

Falklands (1982)

Crisis Number: 336

Triggering Entity: Argentina

Opponents: Argentina

Region: South America

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no United Kingdom foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending British FND. Rather, the crisis was the result of longstanding Argentinian claims to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands dating to before World War II. Argentina launched the war to divert attention from ongoing domestic political problems.⁸⁶

Gulf War (1990)

Crisis Number: 393

Triggering Entity: Iraq

Opponents: Iraq

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no United Kingdom foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending British FND. Rather, the crisis was the result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. That invasion was the result of several factors, including Iraqi belief in a U.S.-Kuwaiti conspiracy to lower oil prices and the Iraqi need to revitalize its flailing economy following the devastating Iran-Iraq War.

Iraq No Fly Zone (1992)

Crisis Number: 406

Triggering Entity: Multi-state

⁸⁶ Amy Oakes, *Diversionsary War: Domestic Unrest and International Conflict* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), chap. 4.

Opponents: Iraq

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no United Kingdom foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending British FND. Rather, the crisis was the result of ongoing U.S.-Iraqi tensions following the Gulf War. In response to central government repression of Iraq's Shiites in the south of Iraq an international coalition created a no-fly zone, similar to what existed in the north to safeguard Iraq's Kurds. The announcement and dispatch of aircraft triggered a crisis for Iraq, "which perceived a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity."

UNSCOM I (1997)

Crisis Number: 422

Triggering Entity: Iraq

Opponents: Iraq

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no United Kingdom foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending British FND. Rather, the crisis was the result of ongoing U.S.-Iraqi tensions following the Gulf War. The crisis began when Iraq "expelled all US inspectors working with UNSCOM [United Nations Special Commission]."

UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox (1998)

Crisis Number: 429

Triggering Entity: Iraq

Opponents: Iraq

Region: Middle East and North Africa

Linked to Foreign Nuclear Deployments: No

Discussion: There was no relationship to foreign nuclear deployments. First, there were no United Kingdom foreign nuclear deployments in the region. Second, the crisis was not due to fear of impending British FND. Rather, the crisis was the result of ongoing U.S.-Iraqi tensions following the Gulf War. The ICB summary concludes: "Following increased questions about the veracity of Iraq's claims that it has no chemical or biological weapons systems, Iraq announced that all UNSCOM activities in Iraq would come to an immediate halt. Cooperation would only resume, according to an Iraqi statement, after the Security Council reviewed the possibility of lifting sanctions on Iraq and after Richard Butler was removed as the UNSCOM chair. This announcement triggered a crisis for the UK and for the US." The United States supported by the United Kingdom launched a series of debilitating air strikes that December.

SECTION TWO.

In this section I replicate and extend Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd Secher's 2014 analysis of conflict and foreign-deployed nuclear weapons from 1950-2001.⁸⁷ This can address whether FNDs make conflict more likely in general by raising tensions even if nuclear deployments are not the direct cause of any particular crisis. Fuhrmann and Sechser utilized militarized interstate dispute (MIDs) data, which in their analysis takes a value of 1 if a state was the target of a MID that resulted in at least one fatality in a given year, to assess if FNDs deter challenges. I utilize their data to flip the question to ask whether FNDs provoke challenges. Utilizing existing data as a robustness check to my analysis reduces the likelihood of investigator bias. The conflict data and all of the control variables are not contingent upon my coding decisions. The original Fuhrmann and Sechser data is available for download at [doi:10.7910/DVN/27466](https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/27466), or by visiting the *American Journal of Political Science* Dataverse at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/ajps> and searching for "Fuhrmann and Sechser." The Stata .do file that contains replication commands and coding for additional variables (discussed below) is available at www.paulavey.com/research.

The key variables of interest are those related to FNDs. The variable for *FND Host* is in the Fuhrmann and Sechser data and takes a value of one if the state hosts a FND in a given year. I then add two additional variables. I code *FND Patron* with a value of one for each year that a state deploys a nuclear weapon abroad. I then created a variable that codes if the state hosted or deployed a nuclear weapon (*FND Participant*). Note that in each case these capture whether a state was a target of a MID. I also included additional analyses using their relaxed coding rules for FND deployments and added variables based on that coding for years of deployments (extending Russia) and if the state hosted or deployed a nuclear weapon.⁸⁸ There were no significant differences in the results.

⁸⁷ Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, "Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (October 2014), pp. 919-935

⁸⁸ They add Soviet nuclear deployments to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine, as well as U.S. non-nuclear deployments to Cuba and France and U.S. deployments to Japanese islands (Chichi Jima, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa).

The other features are identical to Fuhrmann and Sechser. The unit of analysis remains the directed-dyad year, which allows one to differentiate between the initiator and target of each MID. I also utilize the same control variables, probit estimator, and standard errors with dyad fixed effects. I follow Fuhrmann and Sechser and restrict the analysis to politically relevant dyads that contain neighboring states or at least one major power. The control variables include whether the target had an alliance with a nuclear state (*Defense pact with nuclear power*), a non-nuclear state (*Defense pact with nonnuclear power*), the challenger (*Alliance with challenger*) and the number, if any, of U.S. troops the target hosted in a given year (*U.S. troops*). The data also code if the challenger (*Nuclear challenger*) or target (*Nuclear target*) possessed nuclear weapons. Contiguity measures if the dyad members share a land border. *Foreign policy similarity* ranges from -1 to 1, with values closer to 1 indicating more similar voting at the United Nations. The variable *Power ratio* uses Correlates of War Composite Indicator of National Capabilities scores “measures the ratio of the challenger’s material capabilities to the sum of both states capabilities in the dyad.”⁸⁹ *Challenger Polity*, *Target Polity*, and *Challenger Polity x Target Polity* use the Polity IV data to code regime type on a 21 point scale, with higher values indicating a more democratic state. The three time variables address temporal dependence in the data.

Table 1 presents the main results of the analysis (see below). Model 1 replicates the Fuhrmann and Sechser baseline result. The results are identical to those reported in their original article. In each model the variable for a state hosting a foreign-deployed nuclear weapon (*FND Host*) is not significant. In other words, states are not more or less likely to challenge states that host foreign-deployed nuclear weapons. Model 2 shows that there is no statistically significant result for states that deploy nuclear weapons abroad using variables that I coded. States that deploy nuclear weapons abroad are not more likely to be the target of challenges than other states. Association with a nuclear deployment as host or patron does not result in a state being more or less likely to be the target of a dispute (Model 3). In sum, there is little evidence for the claim that FNDs have increased tensions leading to more confrontations.

⁸⁹ Fuhrmann and Sechser, “Signaling Alliance Commitments,” 927.

Table 2 presents a full replication of the original Furhmann and Sechser. I was able to perfectly replicate their results, adding confidence to the additional models that I constructed. Table 3 uses the new variables that I coded to apply the additional robustness checks used in the Furhmann and Sechser analysis. None of the robustness checks altered the results; there was no statistically significant relationship between foreign-deployed nuclear weapons and conflict. In several cases the sign for the coefficient was negative, indicating that the foreign-deployed nuclear weapon made conflict less likely. Though, as noted, the results never approached standard levels of statistical significance. Table 4 includes the relaxed coding for foreign-deployed nuclear weapons.

Appendix - Table 1. Probit Estimates of Militarized Dispute Initiation

	Model 1: Replication	Model 2: Nuclear Patron	Model 3: Foreign Deployed Participant
Defense pact with nuclear power	-0.388*** (0.094)	-0.388*** (0.094)	-0.384*** (0.095)
FND Host	0.097 (0.153)	0.097 (0.154)	
FND Patron		0.001 (0.137)	
FND Participant			0.073 (0.122)
Defense pact with nonnuclear power	0.013 (0.101)	0.013 (0.101)	0.012 (0.102)
U.S. troops	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Nuclear challenger	-0.051 (0.103)	-0.051 (.104)	-0.049 (0.103)
Nuclear target	0.107 (0.123)	0.107 (0.129)	0.085 (0.124)
Contiguity	1.153*** (0.091)	1.153*** (0.091)	1.157*** (0.092)
Alliance with challenger	-0.010 (0.087)	-0.010 (0.087)	-0.015 (0.086)
Foreign policy similarity	-0.331*** (0.068)	-0.331*** (0.068)	-0.327*** (0.068)
Power ratio	0.108 (0.163)	-0.108 (0.163)	0.115 (0.166)
Challenger polity	0.018* (0.007)	0.018* (0.007)	0.018* (0.007)
Target polity	0.032*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)
Challenger polity x target polity	-0.002*** (0.017)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Time	-0.091*** (0.017)	-0.91*** (0.017)	-0.092*** (0.017)
Time ²	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Time ³	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.00)
Constant	-2.861*** (0.171)	-2.861*** (0.170)	-2.871 (0.175)
Observations	85306	85306	85306

Note: Robust standard errors in parantheses.

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001(two-tailed tests).

Appendix - Table 2. Probit Estimates of Militarized Dispute Initiation Replication for Fuhrmann and Sechser 2014

	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Defense pact with nuclear power	-0.388*** (0.094)	-0.219* (0.096)	-0.410*** (0.097)	-0.389*** (0.099)
FND Host	0.097 (0.153)	0.016 (0.152)	-0.264 (0.357)	0.096 (0.154)
Defense pact with nuclear power x FND host			0.427 (0.396)	
Defense pact with nonnuclear power	0.013 (0.101)	-0.022 (0.104)	0.009 (0.102)	0.004 (0.107)
U.S. Troops	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Nuclear challenger	-0.051 (0.103)	-0.015 (0.104)	-0.046 (0.104)	-0.012 (0.092)
Nuclear target	0.107 (0.123)	0.152 (0.126)	0.105 (0.122)	0.067 (0.105)
Contiguity	1.153*** (0.091)	1.193*** (0.097)	1.153*** (0.091)	1.149*** (0.093)
Alliance with challenger	-0.010 (0.087)	-0.081 (0.094)	-0.002 (0.087)	-0.012 (0.089)
Foreign policy similarity	-0.331*** (0.068)	-0.309*** (0.070)	-0.336*** (0.069)	-0.334*** (0.068)
Power ratio	0.108 (0.163)	0.122 (0.164)	0.107 (0.164)	0.009 (0.150)
Challenger polity	0.018* (0.007)	0.018* (0.007)	0.017* (0.007)	0.018* (0.007)
Target polity	0.032*** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)
Challenger polity x target polity	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Time	-0.091*** (0.017)	-0.093*** (0.017)	-0.091*** (0.017)	-0.091*** (0.017)
Time ²	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Time ³	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Constant	-2.861*** (0.171)	-2.875*** (0.175)	-2.852*** (0.172)	-2.804*** (0.184)
Observations	85306	85306	85306	85306

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix - Table 3: Probit Estimates of Militarized Dispute Intiation with New Variables Robustness Checks

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Defense pact with nuclear power	-0.219* (0.096)	-0.410*** (0.097)	-0.389*** (0.099)	-0.221* (0.095)	-0.406*** (0.097)	-0.383*** (0.100)
FND Host	0.016 (0.154)	-0.264 (0.357)	0.097 (0.155)			
FND Patron	-0.004 (0.138)	-0.005 (0.138)	-0.012 (0.137)			
FND Participant				0.028 (0.121)	0.003 (0.131)	0.064 (0.121)
Defense Pact with nonnuclear power	-0.022 (0.104)	0.009 (0.102)	0.005 (0.107)	-0.023 (0.105)	0.009 (0.102)	0.005 (0.107)
U.S. Troops	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Nuclear challenger	-0.015 (0.105)	-0.046 (0.105)	-0.013 (0.093)	-0.014 (0.104)	-0.049 (0.103)	-0.008 (0.092)
Nuclear target	0.153 (0.132)	0.107 (0.129)	0.071 (0.113)	0.146 (0.127)	0.106 (0.123)	0.046 (0.110)
Contiguity	1.193*** (0.097)	1.153*** (0.091)	1.148*** (0.093)	1.195*** (0.097)	1.153*** (0.091)	1.153*** (0.094)
Alliance with challenger	-0.081 (0.094)	-0.002 (0.087)	-0.011 (0.089)	-0.082 (0.094)	-0.005 (0.086)	-0.016 (0.088)
Foreign policy similarity	-0.309*** (0.070)	-0.336*** (0.068)	-0.334*** (0.068)	-0.307*** (0.070)	-0.333*** (0.067)	-0.330*** (0.068)
Power ratio	0.122 (0.164)	0.107 (0.163)	0.009 (0.149)	0.125 (0.166)	0.108 (0.165)	0.012 (0.150)
Challenger polity	0.018* (0.007)	0.017* (0.007)	0.018* (0.007)	0.018* (0.007)	0.018* (0.007)	0.018* (0.007)
Target polity	0.028*** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)
Challenger polity x target polity	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Time	-0.093*** (0.017)	-0.091*** (0.017)	-0.091*** (0.017)	-0.093*** (0.017)	-0.092*** (0.017)	-0.091*** (0.017)
Time ²	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Time ³	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Defense pact with nuclear power x nuclear deployment		0.428 (0.397)			0.163 (0.191)	
Constant	-2.874*** (0.174)	-2.851*** (0.172)	-2.803*** (0.184)	-2.878*** (0.178)	-2.855*** (0.173)	-2.812*** (0.187)
Observations	85306	85306	85306	85306	85306	85306

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Appendix - Table 4. Probit Estimates of Militarized Dispute Initiation Replication Using Relaxed FND Coding

	(13)	(14)	(15)
Defense pact with nuclear power	-0.374*** (0.092)	-0.373*** (0.092)	-0.369*** (0.093)
FND Host Relaxed Coding	0.021 (0.149)	0.024 (0.150)	
FND Patron Relaxed Coding		-0.046 (0.135)	
FND Participant Relaxed Coding			-0.007 (0.118)
Defense pact with nonnuclear power	0.017 (0.101)	0.018 (.100)	0.019 (0.100)
U.S. Troops	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Nuclear challenger	-0.049 (0.104)	-0.051 (0.104)	-0.049 (0.103)
Nuclear target	0.105 (0.123)	0.122 (0.129)	0.106 (0.123)
Contiguity	1.154*** (0.091)	1.150*** (0.090)	1.154*** (0.091)
Alliance with challenger	-0.012 (0.087)	-0.011 (0.087)	-0.013 (0.087)
Foreign policy similarity	-0.331*** (0.068)	-0.333*** (0.067)	-0.332*** (0.068)
Power ratio	0.108 (0.164)	0.104 (0.163)	0.107 (0.166)
Challenger polity	0.018* (0.007)	0.018* (0.007)	0.018* (0.007)
Target polity	0.032*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)
Challenger polity x target polity	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Time	-0.091*** (0.017)	-0.091*** (0.017)	-0.091*** (0.017)
Time ²	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Time ³	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Constant	-2.86*** (0.172)	-2.860*** (0.171)	-2.866*** (0.176)
Observations	85306	85306	85306

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001

SECTION THREE.

This section considers the possibility that foreign-deployed nuclear weapons cause nuclear proliferation. One could argue that nuclear proliferation is another form of belligerent response to a FND. Proliferation might also lead to preventive strikes. Interestingly, in the large political science literature on nuclear proliferation there is little consideration that FNDs are a critical factor in explaining rival or neutral state decisions to acquire nuclear weapons.⁹⁰ I follow existing proliferation literature and focus on horizontal rather than vertical proliferation. Future research could usefully examine if any relationship exists with vertical proliferation.

The United States, Soviet Union, and China all began nuclear programs or acquired nuclear weapons prior to any state deploying nuclear weapons abroad in their region. As such, foreign-deployed nuclear weapons could not have caused nuclear proliferation in these cases and I do not discuss them further. North Korea did expand its nuclear activities after the U.S. nuclear deployment. Several authors claim that the North Korean decision was driven by the U.S. FND to South Korea.⁹¹ The case therefore merits further investigation.

There are several reasons to doubt that the American deployment was critical to the North Korean decision. To begin with, the timing is not as clear-cut as it first appears. North Korean officials began inquiring about nuclear energy and investing in nuclear science prior to the American deployment.⁹² Philip Bleek codes North Korea as exploring a nuclear option in 1962

⁹⁰ See Philip C. Bleek, "Why do States Proliferate: Quantitative Analysis of the Exploration, Pursuit, and Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons," in William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, *Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); Scott D. Sagan, "The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," *Annual Review of Political Science* 14 (2011), 225-244; and Mark S. Bell, "Examining Explanations for Nuclear Proliferation," *International Studies Quarterly*, forthcoming.

⁹¹ Peter Hayes, "North Korean Proliferation and the End of US Nuclear Hegemony," in Morten Bremer Maerli and Sverre Lodgaard, *Nuclear Proliferation and International Security* (London: Routledge, 2007) 120; Michael J. Mazarr, "Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea," *International Security*, 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), 93; Harrison, *Korean Endgame*, chap. 16.

⁹² Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK V.I. Ivanov for 20 January 1956, WCDA, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/120790>; Pollack, *No Exit*, 47-50.

but concludes the DPRK did not make the decision to pursue nuclear weapon acquisition until 1980 – twenty-two years after the American deployment.⁹³ Moreover, while North Korea did occasionally cite the U.S. FND as a reason not to join the NPT they ultimately did join, albeit following Soviet pressure, in 1985.⁹⁴

The withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from the peninsula in 1991 did not lead to a long-term rapprochement or end North Korea's nuclear program. As Etel Solingen points out, "North Korea's 1970s demands that the United States remove tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and pledge nuclear non-aggression ... had been fulfilled by the early 1990s. Yet North Korea engaged in ever more elaborate schemes at that point."⁹⁵ To be sure, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity. On January 20, 1992 North and South Korea signed a Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea nevertheless maintained its nuclear program and was unwilling to allow full IAEA inspections. International suspicion mounted, leading the North to become increasingly obstinate and withdraw from the NPT entirely in March 1993.⁹⁶

Though North Korea engaged in negotiations and suspended its withdrawal from the NPT, the situation on the peninsula rapidly deteriorated.⁹⁷ In June former President Carter traveled to North Korea. Those meetings led to additional negotiations, culminating in the 1994 Agreed Framework. Critical in driving Kim Il-sung to negotiate were a changing geopolitical environment, domestic economic and succession concerns, and pressure from the United

⁹³ Bleek, "Why do States Proliferate?" 168-169.

⁹⁴ Hayes, "North Korean Proliferation," 120; "Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry," August 4, 1983, WCDA, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110141>.

⁹⁵ Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logis: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 119-120.

⁹⁶ Pollack, *No Exit*, 106, 109.

⁹⁷ Lee, *Troubled Peace*, 158-172.

States.⁹⁸ The Agreed Framework froze, but did not dismantle, the North Korean ability to produce nuclear weapons until North Korea deemed sufficient progress made by the United States on security assurances, the creation of an international consortium to construct two light-water reactors, and the delivery of heavy fuel oil.⁹⁹ Pollack argues that Pyongyang had an expansive reading of these commitments, to include “the cessation of US nuclear commitments and alliance obligations to the ROK before North Korea would contemplate or undertake the actions sought by the United States.”¹⁰⁰

This is not to suggest U.S. capabilities and behavior played no role in North Korean decision-making. As noted earlier, North Korean leaders were concerned with the American atomic monopoly. Pyongyang also faced a number of strategic challenges after the 1960s. These included a dynamic South Korea that at times maintained a nuclear program and a desperate search for autonomy in the midst of more powerful allies and adversaries.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Pollack, *No Exit*, 119; Lee, *Troubled Peace*, 173.

⁹⁹ Pollack, *No Exit*, 114; Lee, *Troubled Peace*, 177-178.

¹⁰⁰ Pollack, *No Exit*, 118-119.

¹⁰¹ Pollack, *No Exit*, 63, 72; Mansourov, “The Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program,” 28-29.